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1 Introduction
Productivity growth is not everything, but in the long run it is almost everything (Krugman, 1994).
Gains in productivity, or the efficiency with which inputs are turned into outputs, account for a
substantial fraction of cross country differences in income.1 Therefore, understanding the evolution
of aggregate productivity is a central topic in economics that has received particular theoretical
and empirical attention.
Over the last decades, empiricists showed that the macroeconomic idea of one representative
firm does not tally with reality. Instead, there is tremendous heterogeneity in productivity between
firms, even within narrowly defined industries (Syverson, 2004). This heterogeneity induces several
mechanisms at the micro level. Research on micro channels of aggregate productivity growth estab-
lished both theoretically and empirically the importance of efficient allocation of resources, next to
within firm productivity growth. Bartelsman et al. (2004) and Pages et al. (2009) find within firm
productivity growth to be the most important source of aggregate productivity growth for a large
sample of countries. However, Mitsukuni et al. (2014) show that their findings could be an artifact
of the decomposition methods they used. They find that growth from resource reallocation is ro-
bust and consistent over time. In line with their findings, Van Beveren and Vanormelingen (2014)
show that in Belgium resource reallocation is the most stable determinant of aggregate productivity
growth. Also Bartelsman et al. (2013) and Olley and Pakes (1996) show that the covariance between
size and productivity plays a key role in the aggregate productivity evolution. Furthermore Collard-
Wexler et al. (2011), Banerjee and Moll (2010) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) find efficient
allocation of resources to account for a large part of aggregate productivity variations. The objective
of this paper is to assess the impact of recent recessions on these micro channels. In this paper we
answer the following questions: Did recent recessions have a “cleansing effect”, i.e. was productivity
growth from resource reallocation higher in recession periods than in non-recession periods? How
1The relation between the evolution in GDP per capita and productivity is well established, see the work of
Gordon (2016), Jones and Romer (2010), Caselli (2005), Basu and Fernald (2002), Easterly and Levine (2001), Hall
and Jones (1999), Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) amongst others.
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do these micro channels in entering and exiting firms compare to incumbents in recession versus
non-recession periods? How do manufacturing and services industries differ in realizing productivity
growth over the business cycle?
The idea that recession periods give rise to more efficient resource allocation dates back to
the work of Schumpeter (1939), who advanced the argument that recessions induce productivity
enhancing reallocation by driving out unproductive investments and thereby freeing up resources for
more productive uses. Caballero and Hammour (1994) developed a formal model that incorporates
the cleansing of less efficient production arrangements such that more resources become available
for production arrangements that are relatively more productive. The cleansing hypothesis suggests
increased gross job reallocation during recessions from job destruction that is more procyclical than
job creation. Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and Konings (1995) found that recessions are indeed
associated with countercyclical gross job reallocation. However, there is no ubiquitous evidence in
the literature that this also results in countercyclical aggregate productivity growth (Baily et al.,
2001). The literature proposes various factors that could distort the cleansing mechanism. Firms
could do labor hoarding, which would lower productivity in recession periods. Also, recessions
could affect plant level productivity negatively and this could in itself dominate the increase in
aggregate productivity due to cleansing. Furthermore, Barlevy (2002) argues that recessions could
have a sullying effect because they tend to slow down the matching of newly unemployed with high
productive jobs. This would at least moderate the contribution from job reallocation to aggregate
productivity. While there are mechanisms that could counteract the cleansing effect, there are others
that are in line with countercyclical productivity growth. Aghion and Saint-Paul (1991) argue that
firms engage in productivity-enhancing activities during economic downturns because of temporarily
low opportunity costs in forgone profits. This would lead to countercyclical productivity. Altogether,
it is not obvious a priori what will be the net effect of job reallocation on aggregate productivity
in recession periods. Recently, Foster et al. (2015) picked up on this issue and found for the U.S.
that the intensity of job reallocation during the recent great recession was relatively low and less
productivity enhancing than in previous recessions.
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Entry and exit also have an important role in aggregate productivity dynamics (Clementi and
Palazzo, 2016). Micro-level studies find that entrants have, on average, lower productivity than
incumbents because, for example, it can take some time for entrants to optimize their production
processes. Moreover, entrants often set lower prices than incumbents to gain market share, which
will result in lower revenue productivity levels (Foster et al., 2008). Over time however, the more
productive firms in the entry cohorts survive and their productivity levels may converge to those
of incumbent firms (Aw et al., 2001). Ouyang (2009) argues that recessions could have a scarring
effect on entrants. Recessions are typically characterized by low demand and low profitability. For
infant firms, this can be hard to overcome, resulting in high exit rates of young firms that probably
would have survived in non-recession periods. Amongst these young exiting firms could be firms
that would have become high productive incumbents later on in their life cycle. Therefore, the
scarring effect of recessions could lead to lower aggregate productivity in the long run. Regarding
the contribution of exit to aggregate productivity, the long run equilibrium model of Hopenhayn
(1992) suggests that firms decide to exit when they face low individual productivity shocks. Hence
exit of low productive firms contributes positively to aggregate productivity. Empirical studies
affirm these theoretical predictions, for example Foster et al. (2001) and Aw et al. (2001) find this
to be true for US and Taiwanese manufacturing. In recession periods, the probability that firms
have low individual productivity shocks increases, thereby resulting in higher exit rates.
To measure the microeconomic drivers of productivity growth and the effect of recessions on
these, we will rely on productivity decomposition models because these allow to infer how much
of aggregate productivity growth can be explained by each of the aformentioned channels. More
specifically, we apply the decomposition model of Melitz and Polanec (2015). They extended the
static model of Olley and Pakes (1996) into a dynamic model that also includes entry and exit
components. By relying on the cross-sectional distribution of market shares and productivity, their
model allows natural counterfactuals for the entry and exit components. We complement the results
from this model with the Foster et al. (2001) decomposition to learn how much of productivity
growth is due to (re)allocation of resources.
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This paper aims to understand how recession periods affect the micro origins of aggregate
productivity growth in a small, open and developed economy, Belgium. To that aim, we use a
representative sample of firms active in the Belgium private sector, including both manufacturing
and services industries. This paper touches upon and contributes to several strands in the industrial
organization literature. First, we compare the relative contributions from incumbent, entering and
exiting firms to aggregate productivity growth. In line with expectations, we find that incumbent
firms largely determine aggregate productivity growth. Second, we show aggregate productivity
effects of job reallocation before, during and after recession periods. We find evidence of cleansing
effects, so recession periods induce job reallocation towards the most productive firms. We also find
that the contribution from job reallocation to aggregate productivity growth is higher on average
and more stable than the contribution from within firm productivity growth, which is lower on
average and more volatile. This is consistent with the findings of Van Beveren and Vanormelingen
(2014). Third, we regard the productivity dynamics over the business cycle in entering and exiting
firms. We find that average productivity in entering and exiting firms is generally lower than in
incumbent firms. Moreover, job allocation and productivity are more aligned in the cross section of
exiting firms than in the cross section of entering firms. Fourth and last, we investigate whether and
to which extent each of these micro drivers of aggregate productivity growth are different between
manufacturing and services industries. We find that productivity growth is lower in services sectors,
and that the cleansing effect is far more pronounced in the manufacturing sector. Dynamics from
entry and exit are relatively important determinants of aggregate productivity growth in services
industries, while productivity growth within firms and job reallocation in incumbent firms largely
determines aggregate productivity growth in manufacturing industries.
The remainder of this paper will be organized as follows: in the following section, we elucidate
the empirical framework that will be used to compose aggregate productivity levels and decompose
productivity growth from the macro level to its foundations on the micro level. The third section
describes the data. The fourth section presents and discusses the results. The fifth section concludes
by summarizing our main findings.
5
2 Empirical Framework
Since the productivity concept was introduced by Solow (1957) as the residual of an aggregate
production function, many scholars tried to understand the micro origins of productivity growth at
the aggregate level. Increasing availability of firm level data induced researchers to develop rigorous
decomposition models. Such models typically distinguish three channels through which aggregate
productivity growth can arise. A first channel consists of incumbent firms that succeed in moving
their productivity frontier (within) or succeed in attracting market share from firms with lower pro-
ductivity (reallocation). A second potential driver of aggregate productivity growth is entry of high
productive firms. A third potential channel is exit of low productive firms. Baily et al. (1992) were
the first to propose a comprehensive model to disentangle the black box of aggregate productivity
growth and to identify the contribution from each of these channels. Their model was criticized be-
cause the entry and exit components of their model are biased by construction. Therefore, Griliches
and Regev (1995) and Foster et al. (2001, hereafter FHK) introduced modifications that improve
on this issue. All these models rely on the evolution of the productivity level and market share
of individual firms over time. Another strand of models relies on the mean and covariance of the
joint distribution of productivity and market shares. The first model of this kind was introduced
by Olley and Pakes (1996). Recently, Melitz and Polanec (2015, hereafter MP) developed the so-
called dynamic Olley and Pakes decomposition which extends the static Olley and Pakes (1996)
decomposition into a dynamic model that includes entry and exit.2 The MP model does not suffer
from the measurement bias which is present in decomposition models that rely on the firm level
evolution of productivity and market share. Because of its attractive properties, we rely on the MP
decomposition and complement it with the FHK model where necessary to answer the research
questions.
2The Olley and Pakes (1996) decomposition is interesting in itself. It is a static decomposition that distinguishes
the relative importance of technical efficiency versus optimal allocation of resources in aggregate productivity. The
model we will use heavily relies on this decomposition. Nevertheless, a static approach does not allow to investigate
the role of entry and exit, while this is elementary to the creative destruction concept of Schumpeter (1939) that
underlies cleansing. Therefore we apply dynamic productivity decompositions, which investigate the evolution of
productivity over time and include entering and exiting firms.
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Like in most empirical work and productivity decompositions, aggregate productivity is defined
as a weighted average of firm level productivity levels.3 For the estimation of firm level productivity
measures, we refer to section 3.2 and appendix B. In regard of the pursued research questions,
we choose to aggregate firm level productivity measures using employment shares.4,5 If aggregate
productivity increases due to job reallocation during of right after recession periods, we conclude
that the recession has a cleansing effect, i.e. recessions are associated with or result in employment
shifts from low productivity towards high productivity firms.
The labor share of firm i in industry j at year t is indicated by msijt. Aggregate productivity
is defined as the weighted average of firm level productivity:
Prodt =
∑
j
∑
i
msijt ∗ prodijt (1)
Since productivity is expressed in logs, aggregate productivity growth in percentages can then be
obtained by:
∆Prod = Prodt − Prodt−1 (2)
The emphasis of our paper is on aggregate Total Factor Productivity (TFP). However, the method-
ology also applies to other productivity measures, e.g. labor productivity, for which we present some
results in appendix A.2. We will use two specifications of the MP model. The first decomposition
model is at the level of the economy and the second model extends the first into an industry de-
composition. The derivation of each specification is included in appendix C. Equation (3) presents
the final equation of the economy-wide decomposition:
3One notable exception is the decomposition model of Petrin and Levinsohn (2012) However, their model deviates
by not incorporating separate terms for entering and exiting firms. Therefore, we do not regard their model.
4Aggregation of TFP measures was explored by Domar (1961) and further developed by Hulten (1978). They
indicated the importance of netting out intra-industry flows of intermediary goods to avoid double counting of
outputs on the aggregated level. More recently, Foster et al. (2001) and Van Biesebroeck (2008) discuss the various
possibilities in choosing weighting shares to aggregate TFP measures and how this choice could affect the outcomes
of TFP decompositions at the macro level. By choosing employment shares, we implicitly assume these weights
represent the share of the firm in aggregate productivity.
5This is how we relate job (re)allocation at the micro level with the evolution of productivity at the macro
level. Note that we do not track individuals that change jobs. Job reallocation must be understood as increasing or
decreasing market shares in the labor market.
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∆TFP = tfpS2 − tfpS1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆TFP surv
+
∑
i
(msiS2 −msS2)(tfpiS2 − tfpS2)−
∑
i
(msiS1 −msS1)(tfpiS1 − tfpS1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆Cov(TFP,MS)surv
+MSE2
[
tfpE2 − tfpS2
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
TFP entrt−survt
+MSE2
[∑
i
(msiE2 −msE2)(tfpiE2 − tfpE2)−
∑
i
(msiS2 −msS2)(tfpiS2 − tfpS2)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cov(TFP,MS)entrt−survt
+MSX1
[
tfpS1 − tfpX1
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
TFP survt−1−exitt−1
+MSX1
[∑
i
(msiS1 −msS1)(tfpiS1 − tfpS1)−
∑
i
(msiX1 −msX1)(tfpiX1 − tfpX1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cov(TFP,MS)survt−1−exitt−1
(3)
In which variables in small letters are at the firm level and variables in capital letters at the
aggregate level. Variables that are overlined with a bar denote averages. The subscripts S, E and
X denote the group of surviving, entering and exiting firms. The subscripts i, j and t refer to firm,
group and year. We refer to appendix C for a more detailed explanation and limit ourselves to how
each line of equation (3) relates to the research questions. The first line of equation (3) is the within
component of incumbent firms. According to classic macro-economic models of representative firms,
this is the main source of aggregate productivity growth. In combination with the FHK model (see
infra), the second line of equation (3) allows to quantify the contribution from job reallocation
to aggregate productivity growth. Together the first two lines capture the total contribution from
incumbent firms to aggregate productivity growth. The third and fifth line of equation (3) show
whether the average productivity level of entering and exiting firms is higher or lower than the
average productivity level of surviving firms. Based on theory, one would expect both the average
productivity of new entrants and that of exiting firms to be lower than the average productivity of
incumbents. Whether or not the magnitude of this difference changes over business cycles, depends
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on the discrepancies in behavior and demand each of these groups face over the business cycle. The
fourth and sixth line of equation (3) learns whether job allocation is more efficient in entering or
exiting firms than in incumbent firms. If we assume that firms learn about their productivity over
their life cycle and hire labor according to their productivity levels, we expect both the components
from lines four and six to be negative.
A potential drawback of this intuitive model is that the unit of observation is a firm in the
economy instead of a firm in an industry in the economy. Thereby it does not take into account
heterogeneity between industries. Since market shares are expressed in terms of labor units, this
implies that for example financial institutions and metal producers hire labor from the same labor
market. While this may be true to a certain extent, one could also argue that defining ‘the market’
at the economy-wide level is very rough. Since we estimate the production function at the NACE
two-digit industry level, it is intuitive to define ‘the market’ as well at this level. This approach
adds complexity to the model since job reallocation then must be assessed both within and between
industries. For example, if high productive industries attract employment from low productive
industries, this will result in an increase in aggregate productivity. The decomposition from the
previous section is not able to capture this source of aggregate productivity growth. Therefore, MP
propose an extension of their model that also includes an inter industry covariance component. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to follow this approach apart from MP in their working
paper. The extension of the model is as follows:
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∆TFP =
∑
j
nsj(tfpSj2 − tfpSj1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆TFP surv
+
∑
j
nsj
[∑
i
(msiSj2 −msSj2)(tfpiSj2 − tfpSj2)−
∑
i
(msiSj1 −msSj1)(tfpiSj1 − tfpSj1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆ Intra ind Cov(TFP,MS)surv
+
∑
j
(msSj2 − nsSj)(tfpSj2 − tfpS2)−
∑
j
(msSj1 − nsSj)(tfpSj1 − tfpS1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆ Inter ind Cov(TFP,MS)surv
+
∑
j
msj2 ∗msEj2(tfpEj2 − tfpSj2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intra indentrt−survt
+
∑
j
msj2 ∗msEj2 [(tfpSj2 − tfpEj2)− (TFPS2 − TFPE2)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inter indentrt−survt
+
∑
j
msj1 ∗msXj1(tfpSj1 − tfpXj1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intra indsurvt−1−exitt−1
+
∑
j
msj1 ∗msXj1 [(tfpXj1 − tfpSj1)− (TFPX1 − TFPS1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inter indsurvt−1−exitt−1
(4)
We again refer to appendix C for the complete derivation of the decomposition. The first two lines
of equation (4) are identical to the first two lines of equation (3) except that they are calculated at the
two-digit industry level and then aggregated up. The aggregation measure nsj refers to market share
expressed in number of firms. The first line again refers to the contribution to aggregate productivity
growth that originates from within incumbent firms. The second line shows the contribution to
aggregate productivity from job (re)allocation within industries. The third line learns whether
there is employment growth in firms that operate in high productive industries. So it reflects job
(re)allocation between industries.6 The three first lines together show the contribution of incumbent
firms to aggregate productivity growth. The fourth and fifth line relate to the contribution from
6The covariances regard simultaneous shifts in productivity and respectively intra-industry market share shifts
and inter-industry market share shifts; hence they contain information on the efficiency of allocation, rather than
solely reallocation.
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entry and the sixth and seventh line to the contribution from exit to aggregate productivity growth.
The fourth and sixth line are the intra-industry contributions from entry and exit. These are equal
to the weighted average of industry aggregate productivity premia from entering and exiting firms
over incumbent firms. The fifth and seventh line show the inter-industry contributions from entry
and exit. These are obtained from the weighted sum of the differences in aggregate productivity
premia of entering or exiting firms over incumbents at the industry and the aggregate level. Consider
the following example: assume that aggregate productivity of incumbents is higher than aggregate
productivity of entering and exiting firms and assume that these differences are not the same in
all industries. Under this precondition, there is an additional channel through which aggregate
productivity growth can arise, namely if there is more exit and less entry in those industries in
which there is a higher discrepancy between aggregate productivity of incumbents on the one hand
and entering and exiting firms on the other hand.
A drawback of decomposition models based on cross-sectional distributions is the inability to
distinguish the evolution of market share (in our case, expressed in labor) from the evolution in
productivity. The covariance components of two decompositions presented above learn whether
job allocation is aligned with productivity. However, they do not distinguish between changes in
market share and changes in productivity.7 Hence, it is theoretically possible to find a positive
impact of job reallocation even if market shares remain fixed, i.e. when the effect is solely driven
by productivity changes. To rule out this confounding channel, we complement our analysis with a
decomposition model that tracks firms over time instead of relying on cross-sectional distributions.
More specifically, we use the FHK model to gain more insights in the role of job reallocation:
7The covariance changes can be due to simultaneous job reallocation and productivity reallocation. To see this
more obviously, figure 3 shows scatter plots in which also the averages of productivity and jobs are shown. When firms
move towards the 45 degree line, the covariance components will increase. This can happen both through changes in
jobs and changes in productivity.
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∆TFP =
∑
i
msSi1(tfpSi2 − tfpSi1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆Withinsurv
+
∑
i
(msSi2 −msSi1)(tfpSi1 − tfp1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆Betweensurv
+
∑
i
(msSi2 −msSi1)(tfpSi2 − tfpSi1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆Covariancesurv
+
∑
i
msEi2(tfpEi2 − tfp1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entry
−
∑
i
msXi1(tfpXi1 − tfp1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exit
(5)
The first line in equation (5) refers to the contribution from within firm productivity growth. It
fixes the market share in t− 1 and aggregates up productivity growth in incumbent firms between
t−1 and t. The second line is the between component. It fixes the deviation of an incumbent firm’s
productivity level compared to aggregate productivity in t − 1 and regards the change in market
share between t− 1 and t. This component is particularly interesting with regard to the cleansing
hypothesis because the MP decomposition regards simultaneous changes in productivity and market
share while the between component captures solely the contribution to aggregate productivity
from job reallocation. It is positive when jobs are reallocated to firms with high productivity.
The cleansing hypothesis suggests this component to be positive, and particularly during or right
after recession periods. The third line is usually labeled as the covariance component, although it
is not a covariance from a mathematical perspective. The covariance component shows whether
or not productivity evolves in the same direction as market share. The fifth and sixth line show
the contribution from entry and exit to aggregate productivity growth. As discussed in MP, the
reference levels for these components are imperfect. Therefore, these components will solely serve
as robustness checks for our findings on entry and exit with the MP decompositions.
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3 Data
3.1 Dataset
Our empirical analysis requires productivity measures for a representative sample of Belgian firms
over a time span that includes both recession and non-recession periods. A dataset from the National
Bank of Belgium is used to collect annual accounts for Belgium firms that were active in the period
1997-2014. From this database, we select all firms that are active in the private sector (NACE rev.
1.1 industry 1-74). All firms with limited liability are obliged to file their annual accounts. Small
firms are allowed to report abbreviated annual accounts, while large firms are obliged to report full
annual accounts.8 Full annual accounts contain data that allow to calculate gross output production
functions while data from abbreviated annual accounts restrict to value added production functions.
Since only 7% of the firms files complete accounts, we rely on value added production functions such
that the sample of firms is as representative as possible for the entire private sector of the Belgian
economy. A detailed description of the selected variables from the annual accounts can be found
in appendix B.3. We use deflators from the National Bank of Belgium and Eurostat to transform
nominal values from annual accounts into real values. To define which years were crisis years for
Belgium in our sample period, we use data from the National Bank of Belgium and a recession
indicator from the OECD.9 The textbook definition of a recession is two consecutive quarters of
negative GDP growth. Figure 1 shows quarterly GDP growth for Belgium from 1996-2014. During
this period, there are three recessions: Q1-2001 - Q4-2001; Q3-2008 - Q2-2009; Q2-2012 - Q1-2013.
Obviously, the great recession of 2008-2009 was the most severe of the three. While GDP growth is
the most frequently used indicator of recessions, there are other factors that signal recessions. We
validate our identification of recession periods with the country specific composite leading indicators
from the OECD, which include information on consumer confidence, production, demand, export
8A firm is defined as large when the average annual number of employees is higher than 100 or when at least two
of the following thresholds are surpassed: (i) average annual number of employees equal to 50, (ii) turnover (excluding
VAT) e7.300.000, (iii) balance sheet total e3.650.000.
9The OECD Composite Leading Indicators, “Composite Leading Indicators: Reference Turning Points and Com-
ponent Series”, www.oecd.org/std/cli (Accessed on 06/04/2016)
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orders, employment and passenger car registrations. Based on such indicators, recession periods are
defined as the period between one quarter after the peak and the trough of the composite leading
indicator. Not surprisingly, we find the same three crisis periods in our sample based on these
indicators, namely 2001, 2008-2009 and 2012.
A limitation of our data is one that is encountered in nearly all empirical work in the productiv-
ity literature, namely the absence of prices for inputs and outputs at the firm or product level. The
inability to control for input and output price variation implies that it is impossible to distinguish
between productivity and profitability. Productivity reflects physical efficiency while profitability
depends not only on physical efficiency but also on prices, which reflect product differentiation and
markups in addition to costs. The absence of data on prices requires to impose some assumptions
on the market structure. More specifically, one has to assume single-product firms that produce a
homogeneous product and are active in an industry that is characterized by perfectly competitive
input and output markets. Only under these assumptions, our productivity measures would repre-
sent physical efficiency. Although it is common practice in the productivity literature to impose the
aforementioned set of assumptions, it is rather implausible that firms produce a single good and
are price takers in both the output and input market. De Loecker and Goldberg (2014) provide a
comprehensive overview of the issues that come with estimating production functions and possible
routes to overcome various biases. Unfortunately, the only way around imposing assumptions is to
obtain output and input prices.10 Since we do not have these, we proceed with the notion that we
actually estimate sales generating production functions. Hence our productivity measures reflect
residual profitability or more generally, firm performance, instead of purely true productivity.
As indicated in section 2, we use company accounts data for the estimation of production
functions and the decompositions. Baily et al. (1992) already indicated in their seminal work on
productivity decompositions that productivity decompositions are sensitive to outliers. This is not
10The pass-through literature however is flexible in output and input price variation. A representative paper in
this literature is the one of Amiti et al. (2014). Unfortunately, this literature is based on a demand-based approach
instead of a production function approach, which entails assumptions on demand, market structure and firm behavior.
As we estimate productivity for a large cross section of industries, this is problematic.
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surprising given the well established finding of large tails in productivity distributions and the
importance of the first and second moments of the productivity distribution in productivity de-
compositions. Therefore, both the estimation of the production function and the decomposition
presented in section 2 require data cleaning a priori. We refer to appendix B.3.5 for the choices we
made regarding data cleaning, missing data and outliers. The most important restraints in terms
of data originate from the use of loglinear transformations of our variables and the inability of the
decompositions to cope with missing data. Therefore we are limited to a sample of firms for which
none of the required variables is negative and for which productivity and market share measures
can be obtained for each year they are active. After cleaning our data, we remain a sample of about
80.000 firms for the decompositions. Together, these firms represent 20% of the people working in
the private sector and 11% of total value added created. Summary statistics are provided in table 1
below. Although necessary data cleaning reduced the sample size substantially, figure 2 shows that
aggregate productivity growth based on our sample mimics well aggregate productivity growth
calculated by the European commission, which indicates that our sample is indeed representative.
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3.2 Measuring Productivity
The concept of total factor productivity (TFP) dates back to the work of Solow (1957), who defined
rising TFP as rising output with constant capital and labor inputs. Although the research domain
has developed substantially, the basic idea of TFP as residual output - after controlling for output
created by labor and capital inputs - remains unchanged. There are numerous options available
for economists to measure TFP.11 The TFP estimates in this paper follow from semiparametric
estimation of production functions. We refer to appendix B for a comprehensive overview of the
estimation procedure. The prerequisite of having productivity measures for a sample as large as
possible confines the choice of the estimation approach. Our data favors the use of value added
production functions and investments to proxy for unobserved productivity. In appendix A we also
present a robustness checks based on the more flexible translog production function. All production
functions are estimated at the NACE two-digit industry level with the Wooldridge (2009) one-step
estimator. Firm level TFP measures are indicated by tfpijt in which i refers to firm, j identifies the
affiliation of a firm to an industry and t refers to year. The specification through which we obtain
tfpijt is:
tfpijt = vaijt − βˆlj ∗ lijt − βˆkj ∗ kijt (6)
In which small letters indicate logarithmic transformations. vaijt is deflated value added, lijt
is the number of hours worked, kijt is deflated capital. βˆlj and βˆkj are the estimated production
function coefficients of labor and capital. See table A10 in appendix B for an overview of the
estimated production function coefficients per industry.
11For an extensive overview of various estimation techniques to obtain TFP measures, we refer to Van Biesebroeck
(2007)
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4 Results
4.1 Aggregate productivity growth
Before going into the effects of recent recessions on the micro origins of aggregate productivity
growth, we discuss some general findings about aggregate productivity growth, incumbents, entering
and exiting firms based on the averages from table 2. Over the sample period 1997-2014, yearly
productivity growth in the entire private sector is on average 0.90% with a standard deviation of
1.31%. Altogether, incumbent firms almost entirely determine the aggregate productivity evolution
since the contributions to the aggregate from entry and exit offset each other.12 This is in line with
expectations since the Belgian economy is an advanced and relatively stable economy. For the group
incumbent firms, we find large volatility in average productivity over time. Average productivity
is procyclical, which is in line with the literature. According to Basu and Fernald (2001), this
can be explained by procyclical technology, capacity utilization or by imperfect competition and
increasing returns. Job reallocation consistently positively contributes to aggregate productivity
growth. This source of aggregate productivity growth is less volatile than within firm productivity
growth. Consequently, fluctuations in aggregate productivity over the business cycle are largely
driven by productivity shocks within incumbent firms. Average productivity is consistently lower in
the cross section of exiting firms and therefore exit contributes positively to aggregate productivity
growth. More precisely, this effect increases productivity on average by 0.85% points, with a standard
deviation of 0.27%. Job allocation is more aligned with TFP in exiting firms than in incumbent
firms (see Table 10), which induces a negative contribution to productivity growth of -0.38% on
average with a standard deviation of 0.35%. After the contributions from incumbent and exiting
firms, the remainder of aggregate productivity growth is explained by the dynamics in the group of
entering firms. Entering firms are on average less productive than incumbent firms. As a result, entry
12In our decompositions, entering firms are firms that are active for one year or less. As discussed in section 4.3,
this explains why it seems like they do not contribute to aggregate productivity growth. In fact, the contribution from
young firms (older than one year) to aggregated productivity will be absorbed into the components of incumbent
firms. The yearly entry and exit rates in our sample of firms for the decompositions is respectively 5-8% and 3-5%
which is lower than reported in Geurts (2015). This is due to necessary data cleaning to apply the decomposition.
We are aware of the potential consequences of data cleaning and discuss this in appendix B.3.5.
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initially has a negative impact on aggregate productivity of -0.27% on average and the standard
deviation of this effect is 0.07%. The alignment between TFP and jobs is lowest in the cross section
of entering firms (see table 10). This induces an additional negative contribution from firm entry
to aggregate productivity growth of 0.17% on average with a standard deviation of 0.07%.
4.2 Cleansing effects of recessions
Economy-wide decomposition
The main question we want to answer in our empirical analysis is whether or not recent recessions
displayed a cleansing effect, i.e. did recession periods cause job reallocation from low productive
towards high productive firms? As discussed in section 2, we verify this hypothesis by regarding
the ∆Cov(TFP,MS)surv component from the MP decomposition and the ∆Betweensurv com-
ponent from the FHK decomposition. The MP decomposition shows how much of productivity
growth is explained by changes in the alignment between jobs and productivity while the FHK
decomposition allows to distinguish between job reallocation and productivity shocks. In recessions
periods, ∆Cov(TFP,MS)surv is on average 1.42% while in non-recession periods it is only 0.70%
on average (see table 2 and figure 6). So in recession periods, the contribution from reallocation
to aggregate productivity growth is double as high as in non-recession periods. This also follows
from the ∆Betweensurv component, which is 0.79% on average in recession periods and 0.38% on
average in non-recession periods (see table 3 and figure 8).13 These results support the hypothesis
that recent recessions did indeed induce cleansing effects.
Our finding that the great recession induced a cleansing effect in Belgium is not consistent
the conclusion of Foster et al. (2015), who found for the US that the great recession was less
productivity enhancing than earlier recessions. A potential explanation for the difference between
our results and theirs, is the way jobs are measured. Foster et al. (2015) measure jobs in full
13Note that the MP decomposition shows productivity growth from simultaneous changes in productivity and
jobs while the FHK decomposition shows productivity growth from job reallocation only. This explains why the
∆Cov(TFP,MS)surv component is larger than the ∆Betweensurv component.
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time equivalents while we measure jobs in hours worked.14 Figures 4 and 5 show that gross job
reallocation, measured as in Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), is indeed lower during the great recession
when measured in full time equivalents. This is because, unlike when jobs are measured in hours
worked, there is no strong increase in job destruction when jobs are measured in full time equivalents.
This could be a consequence of firms doing labor hoarding during recession periods, i.e. firms did
not lay off employees when they would otherwise do so, thereby guaranteeing that talent will be
available to the firm when economic conditions improve. This was simplified for Belgian firms
during the great recession as the government allowed firms to temporarily make people unemployed
and gave financial support to those employees.15 Tables A5 and A6 show the results of the MP
and FHK decompositions in which jobs are measured in full time equivalents. Comparing the
average contributions of reallocation to productivity growth based on these results, we find that the
∆Cov(TFP,MS)surv component is on average 1.18% in recession periods and 0.82% on average in
non-recession periods while the ∆Betweensurv component is 0.45% on average in recession periods
and 0.42% on average in non-recession periods. What stands out in the results, is that the high
covariance and between component in the great recession do not show up in the decompositions that
use jobs expressed in full time equivalents. As a result, we come to a similar conclusion as Foster
et al. (2015) when expressing jobs as full time equivalents instead of in hours worked, namely that
the great recession was associated with productivity enhancing job reallocation that was larger
than in non-recession periods, but this cleansing effect was less outspoken than in other recession
periods.
In the remainder of this section, we disentangle our findings at the industry level, highlight other
findings related to the cleansing effect and present some robustness checks.
14Foster et al. (2015) uses job creation and job destruction measures from the U.S. Business Dynamics Statistics,
in which employment is defined as ‘Paid employment of full and part-time employees, including salaried officers and
executives of corporations, who were on the payroll in the pay period including March 12. Included are employees on
sick leave, holidays, and vacations; not included are proprietors and partners of unincorporated businesses.’ This is
consistent with the Belgian definition of a full time equivalent. See section B.3.2 in appendix for further information
on the job measures we use.
15Temporary unemployment support already exists for a long time, but only since the great recession it also
applies to white collar workers.
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Industry Decomposition
The extended MP model allows to obtain further insights in job reallocation by providing a measure
of both within and between industry job reallocation.16 Table 4 shows that productivity increasing
reallocation takes place both within (∆ Intra ind Cov(TFP,MS)surv) and between (∆ Inter ind
Cov(TFP,MS)surv) industries, and the magnitude of this effect is for most years larger within
industries than between industries. This is also the case in the first year of the great recession. In
2009 however, the contribution from reallocation to aggregate productivity is driven by between
industry reallocation. To gain deeper understanding in this anomaly, we compare the industry
decomposition based on hours worked (table 4) with the industry decomposition based on full time
equivalents (table A9) for the great recession. The contribution from within industry reallocation is
similar in both decompositions, but in 2009 the contribution from between industry reallocation is
only 0.50% when jobs are measured in full time equivalents while it is 1.25% when jobs are measured
in hours worked. The reason for this is that in low productive industries, there was a substantial
drop in the number of hours worked but the number of full time equivalents did not drop to the
same extent, indicating that labor hoarding was especially applied in low productive industries.
Furthermore, it is interesting to look at the evolution of the intra and inter industry covariances.
Figure 12 shows how these covariances evolve over time. An interesting finding is that both increase
over time, so high productive firms become more successful in attracting employees, thereby increas-
ing aggregate productivity. The intra industry covariance amounts to 25% for the private sector. In
an accounting sense, this implies that aggregate productivity is 25% higher than when jobs would
be randomly allocated within industries. Bartelsman et al. (2013) find this covariance to be 50% for
US manufacturing industries, but only 20-30% in Western Europe, so our results are in line with
their findings.
16As mentioned before and more explicitly shown for both the general and the extended MP decomposition in
appendix C and figure 3, covariances do not distinguish between aggregate effects from job reallocation and aggregate
effects from productivity shocks. Therefore, findings based on these decompositions should rather be interpreted as
findings on the alignment between productivity and market share expressed in jobs.
20
Other findings
So far, we discussed how recession periods induced productivity enhancing reallocation. However,
this does not imply that a social planner wants recessions to take place. Our decompositions show
that recession periods also have negative effects on productivity growth in incumbent firms. Average
productivity in incumbent firms is clearly lower during recession periods, with negative consequences
for aggregate productivity growth. The literature on cleansing effects also proposed alternative
mechanisms that counteract the cleansing effect. The positive consequences in the short run from
cleansing effects of recessions could be mitigated or offset by negative consequences from a scar-
ring effect of recessions in the long run. The scarring effect states that the recession kills potential
good entrants in their infancy. When young firms with high potential are unable to survive, this
negatively impacts aggregate productivity in the long run (Ouyang, 2009). Indeed, we see that it is
harder for young firms to survive in crisis periods, for example in the great recession and the 2012
recession respectively 55% and 50% of the exiting firms is less than five years old, while on average
only 33% of exiting firms is less than five years old. This suggests the great recession did have a
scarring effect in Belgium.
Robustness checks
We test the robustness of our findings by performing the decompositions based on TFP estimates
from Translog production functions and by using labor productivity instead of TFP (see section A
in appendix). The results of the decompositions based on TFP measures from Translog production
functions are in line with the findings from TFP measures obtained from the standard Cobb Dou-
glas production function. In fact, the cleansing effect is more outspoken using TFP measures from
Translog production functions. When using labor productivity instead of TFP, we find that aggre-
gate productivity growth originating from reallocation (∆Cov(LP,MS)surv) decreases over time,
but goes up in recession periods, which is consistent with our findings based on TFP measures.
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4.3 Entry and exit
Entry of high productive firms and exit of obsolete firms are important drivers of aggregate produc-
tivity growth (Clementi and Palazzo, 2016). We question the effects of recent recessions on these
determinants of aggregate productivity growth. To this aim, we rely on the MP decomposition
because it is superior to other methods for measuring productivity growth from entry and exit (see
section 2 and appendix C).17 The averages of columns five to eight of table 2 learn that entering
and exiting firms are on average less productive than incumbent firms and that the link between
market share and productivity is strongest in exiting firms and weakest in entering firms (also see
table 10). Exit of low productive firms consistently contributes to productivity growth. However,
the opposite is true for entering firms. One may be intended to conclude from these results that
new firms do not contribute to aggregate productivity growth. Nonetheless, the literature provides
various explanations for the initially negative impact of entering firms on aggregate productivity
growth. As documented by Aw et al. (2001), entrants are a heterogeneous group. Some of them fail,
but others grow and are important for aggregate productivity growth in the long run (Hyytinen and
Maliranta, 2013). Also entrants could charge low prices to gain market share (Foster et al., 2008).
Since we estimate sales generating production functions, we are unable to correct for this potential
bias. Moreover, entering firms possibly still have to optimize their production processes and learn
about their own potential and the market. This will show up in lower productivity and will dis-
tort the relation between market share and productivity in the cross section of entering firms. The
opposite is true for exiting firms. These firms have already learned about their productivity and
market potential, and therefore the number of employees will be more aligned with productivity in
this group of firms, which shows up in higher covariance components for exiting firms.
The difference in average productivity between incumbent, entering and exiting firms seems
not to be substantially affected by recessions. It stands out that over time the difference between
17Also, the entry and exit components from the MP decomposition provide richer insights than these of the FHK
decomposition, which is why these only serve as robustness check. As expected, the sum of the two entry and two
exit components from the MP decomposition are always close to the entry and exit components reported in the FHK
decomposition.
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average productivity in incumbent and exiting firms declined. The narrowing of this gap squares
with the idea that the Belgian economy became more competitive. Furthermore it is interesting to
relate the evolution in ∆TFP surv with the TFP entrt−survt and TFP survt−1−exitt−1 components.
In all recession periods, average productivity in incumbent firms goes down. Since the differences in
average productivity with entering and exiting firms does not substantially differ between recession
and non-recession periods, this shows that entering and exiting firms faced similar productivity
shocks from recessions as incumbent firms.18
By comparing the covariances between market share and productivity for the group of surviving,
entering and exiting firms, we learn about the type of firms that enter and exit. Table 2 shows that
the Cov(TFP,MS)survt−1−exitt−1 component was particularly large in 2003 and 2010, meaning
that the difference in the covariances between incumbent and exiting firms was large. Table 10
shows that this is due to a high covariance between market share and productivity in the cross
section of exiting firms in 2002 and 2009, which are both at the end of recession periods. So in
these years, more exiting firms can be found in the first and third quadrant of figure 3, meaning
that at the end of recessions there are more large firms with high productivity and small firms with
low productivity that exit, resulting in lower aggregate productivity. Also in the group of entering
firms, there seems to be an effect from recession periods on the covariance component. Table 2
shows that Cov(TFP,MS)entrt−survt is lower in recession periods. From table 10 we learn this is
the result of a low covariance between market share and productivity in the group of entering firms
during recession periods. So during recessions, the link between productivity and employment is less
strong. This is consistent with the scarring effect of recessions hypothesis, namely that recessions
distort growth opportunities of high potential entrants.
The extended industry to aggregate MP decomposition has a different approach to infer the
aggregate impact of entry and exit (see section 2 and appendix C). The Intra indentrt−survt and
Intra indsurvt−1−exitt−1 components from table 4 show that industry aggregate TFP of entering and
18Note that this result is also a consequence of the number of exiting firms that did not go up substantially in
the great recession. This finding emerges in our sample, but also in the business demography statistics for Belgium
on Eurostat, which show that only after the great recession the number of firm deaths increased.
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exiting firms is generally lower than industry aggregate TFP of incumbent firms, which is consistent
with our previous findings. One exception is the year 2010. This indicates that in the aftermath of
the great recession there was a large share of industries in which industry aggregate TFP of exiting
firms was higher than that of incumbent firms.19 Furthermore, the Inter indentrt−survt component
from table 4 shows that firms consistently enter more in industries in which entrants perform better.
More specifically, since in most industries entering firms have lower aggregate productivity, this
means that there is more firm entry, expressed in number of jobs, in industries where productivity
of entrants is closer to productivity of incumbents. Finally, the Inter indsurvt−1−exitt−1 component
from table 4 is mostly negative, although positive for the years 2002 and 2010, both after recession
periods. This indicates that in the aftermath of recessions the loss of jobs from firm exit is larger
in industries in which exiting firms have productivity levels that are relatively close to those of
incumbent firms.
4.4 Manufacturing vs. Services
Tables (5) to (8) provide deeper insights in how the manufacturing sector compares with the services
sector. This is particularly interesting because, like in most European countries, since long there is
a shift in employment from the manufacturing to the services sector. Applying our empirical frame-
work separately to the manufacturing and services sector allows us to contribute to the discussion
on how a shift towards a services economy affects economic growth and how recessions affect these
sectors differently. When comparing aggregate productivity growth in the manufacturing with the
services sector, it shows that productivity growth is on average only 0.30% per year in the services
sector while it is 1.54% in the manufacturing sector. One immediate and clear finding is that within
firm productivity growth is positive on average in the manufacturing sector while it is negative on
average in the services sector, see third column of tables (5) and (7). This is in line with the premise
that it is harder to realize productivity growth in services activities by nature.
19Note that this was not apparent from the economy-wide MP decomposition, which showed that unweighted
average productivity of incumbent firms was larger than unweighted average productivity of exiting firms.
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Looking at the average contributions from incumbent, entering and exiting firms to aggregate
productivity, we find that in the manufacturing sector, productivity growth is largely driven by
incumbent firms while in the services sector productivity growth is largely driven by industry
dynamics from entry and exit. Both in the manufacturing and services sector it is generally the
case that entering and exiting firms have lower productivity than incumbents while job allocation is
most efficient in the group of exiting firms and least efficient in the group of entering firms. However,
this pattern is far more pronounced in the services sector.
Furthermore, the TFP survt−1−exitt−1 component of table (7) shows that the discrepancy in
average productivity between exiting and incumbent firms in the services sector is relatively large
in the great recession.20 From the Cov(TFP,MS)survt−1−exitt−1 component we learn that there is
more exit of firms for which their size is representative of their productivity at the end of the great
recession.
On the discussion about cleansing effects from recessions, we find strong evidence of cleansing
effects in the manufacturing sector but the same cannot be said for the services sector. Figure 13
shows the evolution of the difference in the covariance component of the MP decomposition, i.e.
∆Cov(TFP,MS)surv,manufacturing − ∆Cov(TFP,MS)surv,services from tables 5 and 7, and the
difference in the between component of the FHK decomposition, i.e. ∆Betweensurv,manufacturing−
∆Betweensurv,services from tables 6 and 8. These differences are positive in recession periods,
especially in the great recession, indicating stronger cleansing in manufacturing than in services in-
dustries. Especially in 2009, which is the deepest recession year of sample period (see figure 1), there
is a 3.97% aggregate productivity growth in the manufacturing sector due to increased efficiency of
job allocation, while the average contribution of this component to aggregate productivity is only
0.82%. The between component from the FHK decomposition is also far above average in 2009,
which confirms that job reallocation rather than changes in productivity did induce productivity
growth in the manufacturing sector.
20In principle, this result could also originate from a higher market share of exiting firms in these periods, however
this is not the case for our sample of firms.
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So altogether, we find proof of cleansing effects from recessions in the manufacturing sector. For
the services sector, the between components from the FHK decomposition are slightly higher than
average during or right after recession periods, which indicates there is job reallocation towards firms
that have higher than average productivity. However, the strong negative covariance terms from
the FHK decomposition indicate that downsizing firms become more productive and upsizing firms
less productive. This also follows from absence of clear patterns in the MP decomposition. So in
the services sector, the modestly positive effect from cleansing is confounded by lower productivity
for these upsizing firms in the subsequent year.
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5 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature by investigating how recessions affect the micro origins of
aggregate productivity growth. To this end, we use firm level data from the entire private sector of
Belgium for the years 1997−2014 and apply the recent decomposition model of Melitz and Polanec
(2015) and the Foster et al. (2001) decomposition model. The empirical framework is very rich and
offers a wide variety of insights on the determinants of aggregate productivity growth in incumbent,
entering and exiting firms over the business cycle.
In this paper we answer three questions. The first and foremost question we answer is whether
recent recessions had a cleansing effect, i.e. was productivity growth from job reallocation higher
in recession periods than in non-recession periods? By using jobs as aggregation measure for firm
level productivity, the reallocation components in the decompositions reflect the contribution to
aggregate productivity from job reallocation. We find that aggregate productivity growth from
reallocation is consistently positive over time. This is in line with earlier work on the Belgian
private sector (Van Beveren and Vanormelingen, 2014). The contribution of within firm productivity
growth on the other hand has a procyclical nature. Hence, aggregate productivity variation over the
business cycle is largely driven by productivity shocks within incumbent firms. The contribution to
aggregate productivity from job reallocation is substantially larger during and right after recession
periods than in non-recession periods. Hence, we conclude that recessions displayed a cleansing
effect, i.e. recessions induced job reallocation towards more productive firms. This cleansing effect
takes place both within and between industries, although it is more prominent within industries.
However, our findings depend on how jobs are measured. When measuring jobs based on full time
equivalents instead of hours worked as in Foster et al. (2015), we reach a similar conclusion for
Belgium as was found for the US, namely that the great recession was associated with productivity
enhancing job reallocation that was larger than in non-recession periods, but this cleansing effect
was less outspoken than in other recession periods. The reason why we do find cleansing effects
when measuring jobs in hours worked, could be that firms did labor hoarding in the great recession.
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The second question we answer is how entering and exiting firms compare to incumbent firms
in recession versus non-recession periods. Overall, incumbent firms are the most important source
of aggregate productivity growth, while the role of entry and exit is rather moderate. Average
productivity in entering and exiting firms is lower than in incumbent firms, and the alignment
between jobs and productivity is strongest in exiting firms and weakest in entering firms. Entering
and exiting firms seem to face similar productivity shocks from recessions. However, the covariance
between market share and productivity is higher for exiting firms at the end of recession periods.
The reason for this is that, at the end of recessions, there is more exit of firms for which their size is
representative of their productivity. Furthermore, we find some indications that recessions induce
a scarring effect on entrants, i.e. recessions restrain entrants from growing.
The last question we answer is to which extent manufacturing and services industries differ
in realizing productivity growth over the business cycle. As indicated by Foster et al. (2015), the
literature so far did not provide an answer on how the cleansing effect differs between manufac-
turing and services industries. We find strong evidence for cleansing effects from recessions in the
manufacturing sector, but the same cannot be said for the services sector. Instead, we find that exit
of low productive firms is an important determinant of aggregate productivity growth in services
industries. The same is not true for manufacturing industries, in which productivity dynamics in
incumbent firms largely determine aggregate productivity.
A limitation of papers based on productivity decompositions is the absence of confidence inter-
vals, and thus the degree of uncertainty on the results they provide. This limits the insights one can
obtain from them to stylized facts. One way forward could be to construct confidence intervals based
on bootstrapping. Another way forward would be to extend the model of Hyytinen et al. (2016),
who show how a moment-based estimation procedure can be used to compute standard errors for
the static Olley and Pakes (1996) decomposition, to the more advanced Melitz and Polanec (2015)
model. Furthermore, it would be interesting to investigate which firm level heterogeneity drives the
reallocation components.
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6 Tables
6.1 Summary statistics
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Employees (FTE) 8.91 3.30 40.96 0.00 4347.00
Hours Worked 13943.67 5200.00 62027.85 2.00 6.64e+06
Value Added 608640.02 185329.18 5.51e+06 180.81 1.40e+09
Ln TFP 4.96 4.88 0.73 0.01 10.17
Capital 590252.42 102690.20 5.45e+06 1.15 5.58e+08
Notes: Summary statistics for the sample of 80.000 firms from the Belgian private sector that
can be used for the productivity decompositions.
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6.2 Decomposition for entire private sector
Table 2: MP decomposition - NACE 1-74
Surviving firms Entering firms Exiting firms
4 TFP surv 4 Cov(TFP,MS)surv TFP entrt−survt Cov(TFP,MS)entryt−survt TFP survt−1−exitt−1 Cov(TFP,MS)survt−1−exitt−1
Year 4 TFP
1998 -0.18 -1.73 1.57 -0.36 -0.12 1.06 -0.61
1999 2.15 0.86 0.91 -0.35 -0.06 0.93 -0.14
2000 1.72 0.40 0.98 -0.29 -0.09 1.15 -0.42
2001 1.95 -0.78 2.52 -0.26 -0.18 1.29 -0.63
2002 1.19 -0.18 1.17 -0.24 -0.25 1.33 -0.63
2003 1.77 0.56 1.43 -0.14 -0.14 1.13 -1.08
2004 1.70 -0.11 1.26 -0.16 -0.12 1.01 -0.18
2005 0.79 0.33 0.38 -0.21 -0.15 0.70 -0.25
2006 1.78 1.56 -0.22 -0.24 -0.11 0.74 0.05
2007 1.29 1.80 -0.39 -0.22 -0.25 0.60 -0.24
2008 -1.78 -1.98 0.33 -0.26 -0.27 0.71 -0.30
2009 2.40 0.95 1.56 -0.31 -0.23 0.68 -0.24
2010 -0.24 0.68 -0.05 -0.29 -0.26 0.89 -1.21
2011 -1.44 -0.67 -0.62 -0.36 -0.17 0.53 -0.15
2012 -0.94 -2.06 1.25 -0.31 -0.21 0.58 -0.17
2013 1.34 0.54 0.66 -0.19 -0.18 0.50 0.00
2014 1.83 -0.19 2.06 -0.32 -0.08 0.65 -0.29
Total 0.90(1.31) -0.00(1.14) 0.87(0.87) -0.27(0.07) -0.17(0.07) 0.85(0.27) -0.38(0.35)
Notes: The naming of the decomposition components is consistent with section 2. The numbers in the table are percentages. The
TFP measures are obtained from estimating value added production functions at the two-digit level, additional information on these
estimations is provided in appendix B. The decomposition is based on a sample of about 80.000 firms of the Belgian private sector.
Table 3: FHK decomposition - NACE 1-74
Surviving firms
4 Withinsurv 4 Betweensurv 4 Covariancesurv
Year 4 TFP Entry Exit
1998 -0.18 0.25 0.27 -0.66 -0.47 0.43
1999 2.15 1.88 0.32 -0.44 -0.37 0.76
2000 1.72 1.48 0.42 -0.53 -0.34 0.69
2001 1.95 1.53 0.63 -0.42 -0.41 0.63
2002 1.19 0.79 0.74 -0.54 -0.47 0.67
2003 1.77 1.77 0.65 -0.46 -0.24 0.04
2004 1.70 1.37 0.22 -0.44 -0.25 0.80
2005 0.79 0.62 0.54 -0.47 -0.34 0.43
2006 1.78 1.80 0.06 -0.54 -0.31 0.77
2007 1.29 1.90 0.00 -0.52 -0.44 0.35
2008 -1.78 -1.42 0.26 -0.46 -0.56 0.40
2009 2.40 1.51 1.34 -0.39 -0.49 0.43
2010 -0.24 0.91 0.19 -0.49 -0.55 -0.31
2011 -1.44 -0.74 0.05 -0.58 -0.55 0.38
2012 -0.94 -1.14 0.91 -0.57 -0.53 0.40
2013 1.34 0.85 0.93 -0.59 -0.34 0.49
2014 1.83 1.96 0.48 -0.61 -0.35 0.35
Total 0.90(1.31) 0.90(1.08) 0.47(0.36) -0.51(0.07) -0.41(0.11) 0.45(0.28)
Notes: The naming of the decomposition components is consistent with section 2. The numbers in
the table are percentages. The TFP measures are obtained from estimating value added production
functions at the two-digit level, additional information on these estimations is provided in appendix
B. The decomposition is based on a sample of about 80.000 firms of the Belgian private sector.
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6.3 Extended Decomposition
Table 4: MP industry to sector decomposition - NACE 1-74
Surviving firms Entering firms Exiting firms
4 TFP surv 4 Intra Ind Cov(TFP,MS)surv 4 Inter ind Cov(TFP,MS)surv Intra Indentrt−survt Inter Indentrt−survt Intra Indsurvt−1−exitt−1 Inter Indsurvt−1−exitt−1
Year 4 TFP
1998 -0.18 -1.73 0.90 0.67 -0.69 0.21 0.70 -0.25
1999 2.15 0.86 0.51 0.40 -0.57 0.16 0.70 0.08
2000 1.72 0.40 0.47 0.50 -0.52 0.15 0.87 -0.15
2001 1.95 -0.78 1.54 0.99 -0.53 0.08 0.60 0.06
2002 1.19 -0.18 0.84 0.33 -0.60 0.10 0.55 0.14
2003 1.77 0.56 0.25 1.18 -0.54 0.26 0.41 -0.36
2004 1.70 -0.11 0.52 0.74 -0.52 0.24 0.49 0.33
2005 0.79 0.33 0.28 0.10 -0.61 0.25 0.37 0.08
2006 1.78 1.56 0.19 -0.41 -0.61 0.26 0.58 0.20
2007 1.29 1.80 0.23 -0.62 -0.65 0.18 0.41 -0.05
2008 -1.78 -1.98 1.04 -0.71 -0.73 0.19 0.45 -0.04
2009 2.40 0.95 0.31 1.25 -0.77 0.23 0.50 -0.06
2010 -0.24 0.68 -0.06 0.01 -0.74 0.19 -0.46 0.14
2011 -1.44 -0.67 0.16 -0.78 -0.77 0.23 0.50 -0.12
2012 -0.94 -2.06 0.88 0.36 -0.73 0.20 0.46 -0.05
2013 1.34 0.54 0.39 0.28 -0.57 0.20 0.56 -0.06
2014 1.83 -0.19 1.43 0.63 -0.74 0.35 0.52 -0.16
Total 0.90(1.31) -0.00(1.14) 0.58(0.45) 0.29(0.63) -0.64(0.09) 0.20(0.06) 0.48(0.27) -0.02(0.17)
Notes: The naming of the decomposition components is consistent with section 2. The numbers in the table are percentages. The
TFP measures are obtained from estimating value added production functions at the two-digit level, additional information on these
estimations is provided in appendix B. The decomposition is based on a sample of about 80.000 firms of the Belgian private sector.
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6.4 Decomposition for manufacturing sector
Table 5: MP decomposition - Manufacturing sector - NACE 15-36
Surviving firms Entering firms Exiting firms
4 TFP surv 4 Cov(TFP,MS)surv TFP entrt−survt Cov(TFP,MS)entryt−survt TFP survt−1−exitt−1 Cov(TFP,MS)survt−1−exitt−1
Year 4 TFP
1998 2.32 2.27 0.12 -0.15 -0.16 0.82 -0.58
1999 2.98 0.08 1.99 -0.11 0.09 0.58 0.36
2000 2.17 3.27 -1.44 -0.11 -0.07 0.83 -0.31
2001 2.87 0.65 1.83 -0.06 -0.14 1.08 -0.49
2002 1.26 -0.53 1.68 -0.07 -0.29 0.91 -0.43
2003 4.20 3.01 0.94 -0.06 -0.17 0.65 -0.17
2004 2.75 0.08 1.60 -0.05 0.14 0.72 0.26
2005 1.04 0.75 -0.13 -0.04 0.03 0.35 0.09
2006 2.40 3.13 -1.42 -0.11 -0.19 0.39 0.60
2007 0.32 0.98 -0.34 -0.06 -0.28 0.56 -0.54
2008 -3.29 -2.31 -0.74 -0.08 -0.35 0.69 -0.49
2009 4.70 0.65 3.97 -0.06 -0.18 0.37 -0.06
2010 0.93 -0.98 1.90 -0.09 -0.25 0.43 -0.08
2011 -3.28 -2.08 -1.20 -0.15 -0.14 0.41 -0.11
2012 0.45 -0.98 1.29 -0.04 -0.23 0.25 0.16
2013 1.40 -0.82 2.02 -0.04 -0.16 0.25 0.15
2014 2.95 2.02 1.78 -0.17 -0.30 0.51 -0.89
Total 1.54(2.18) 0.54(1.74) 0.82(1.52) -0.09(0.04) -0.16(0.14) 0.58(0.24) -0.15(0.39)
Notes: The naming of the decomposition components is consistent with section 2. The numbers in the table are percentages. The
TFP measures are obtained from estimating value added production functions at the two-digit level, additional information on these
estimations is provided in appendix B. The decomposition is based on a sample of about 8.000 firms of the Belgian manufacturing
sector.
Table 6: FHK decomposition - Manufacturing sector - NACE 15-36
Surviving firms
4 Withinsurv 4 Betweensurv 4 Covariancesurv
Year 4 TFP Entry Exit
1998 2.32 2.84 -0.16 -0.31 -0.29 0.23
1999 2.98 2.27 0.02 -0.21 0.00 0.91
2000 2.17 1.96 0.10 -0.23 -0.16 0.50
2001 2.87 2.49 0.08 -0.08 -0.20 0.58
2002 1.26 0.79 0.55 -0.18 -0.35 0.47
2003 4.20 3.12 0.94 -0.13 -0.21 0.48
2004 2.75 1.81 0.04 -0.16 0.11 0.95
2005 1.04 0.19 0.63 -0.21 -0.01 0.43
2006 2.40 1.70 0.17 -0.15 -0.29 0.97
2007 0.32 1.24 -0.43 -0.16 -0.34 0.02
2008 -3.29 -2.77 -0.03 -0.22 -0.45 0.19
2009 4.70 1.88 2.66 0.07 -0.22 0.31
2010 0.93 1.38 -0.27 -0.18 -0.34 0.34
2011 -3.28 -3.05 -0.09 -0.12 -0.32 0.30
2012 0.45 -0.43 1.06 -0.32 -0.27 0.41
2013 1.40 0.75 0.63 -0.19 -0.19 0.40
2014 2.95 3.58 0.36 -0.17 -0.45 -0.37
Total 1.54(2.18) 1.16(1.84) 0.37(0.72) -0.17(0.09) -0.23(0.15) 0.42(0.33)
Notes: The naming of the decomposition components is consistent with section 2. The numbers in
the table are percentages. The TFP measures are obtained from estimating value added production
functions at the two-digit level, additional information on these estimations is provided in appendix
B. The decomposition is based on a sample of about 8.000 firms of the Belgian manufacturing sector.
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6.5 Decomposition for services sector
Table 7: MP decomposition - Services sector - NACE 50-74
Surviving firms Entering firms Exiting firms
4 TFP surv 4 Cov(TFP,MS)surv TFP entrt−survt Cov(TFP,MS)entryt−survt TFP survt−1−exitt−1 Cov(TFP,MS)survt−1−exitt−1
Year 4 TFP
1998 -2.25 -2.64 0.26 -0.63 -0.19 1.51 -0.56
1999 1.88 1.20 0.66 -0.70 -0.26 1.39 -0.41
2000 0.21 -1.48 1.09 -0.53 -0.16 1.72 -0.44
2001 1.00 -1.38 1.86 -0.54 -0.28 2.06 -0.73
2002 1.07 -0.26 0.91 -0.45 -0.31 1.93 -0.75
2003 0.54 0.36 0.82 -0.38 -0.16 1.81 -1.90
2004 0.56 -0.75 1.24 -0.35 -0.28 1.02 -0.31
2005 -0.03 -0.62 0.58 -0.46 -0.29 1.16 -0.40
2006 1.42 1.15 -0.15 -0.43 -0.06 0.95 -0.04
2007 2.31 2.57 -0.19 -0.35 -0.31 0.70 -0.11
2008 -1.40 -1.76 0.54 -0.47 -0.31 0.89 -0.28
2009 0.92 0.88 0.31 -0.53 -0.32 0.88 -0.30
2010 -0.41 1.64 -0.46 -0.50 -0.33 1.34 -2.10
2011 -0.29 -0.18 0.18 -0.59 -0.23 0.68 -0.14
2012 -2.65 -2.37 0.08 -0.57 -0.22 0.81 -0.38
2013 0.91 1.09 -0.14 -0.44 -0.16 0.65 -0.09
2014 1.24 -0.54 1.73 -0.73 0.08 0.75 -0.06
Total 0.30(1.36) -0.18(1.47) 0.55(0.67) -0.51(0.11) -0.22(0.11) 1.19(0.47) -0.53(0.59)
Notes: The naming of the decomposition components is consistent with section 2. The numbers in the table are percentages. The
TFP measures are obtained from estimating value added production functions at the two-digit level, additional information on these
estimations is provided in appendix B. The decomposition is based on a sample of about 55.000 firms of the Belgian services sector.
Table 8: FHK decomposition - Services sector - NACE 50-74
Surviving firms
4 Withinsurv 4 Betweensurv 4 Covariancesurv
Year 4 TFP Entry Exit
1998 -2.25 -1.64 0.30 -0.96 -0.86 0.90
1999 1.88 2.05 0.43 -0.65 -0.89 0.94
2000 0.21 -0.13 0.55 -0.78 -0.67 1.23
2001 1.00 0.65 0.55 -0.68 -0.78 1.26
2002 1.07 0.93 0.54 -0.81 -0.71 1.13
2003 0.54 1.48 0.34 -0.67 -0.52 -0.09
2004 0.56 0.71 0.40 -0.63 -0.60 0.69
2005 -0.03 0.13 0.45 -0.63 -0.73 0.74
2006 1.42 1.69 0.06 -0.78 -0.44 0.88
2007 2.31 2.96 0.05 -0.70 -0.58 0.57
2008 -1.40 -0.76 0.17 -0.60 -0.80 0.59
2009 0.92 1.26 0.48 -0.57 -0.81 0.56
2010 -0.41 1.51 0.25 -0.61 -0.82 -0.74
2011 -0.29 0.44 0.38 -0.83 -0.80 0.53
2012 -2.65 -2.09 0.48 -0.62 -0.84 0.42
2013 0.91 1.01 0.69 -0.77 -0.57 0.55
2014 1.24 1.38 0.49 -0.71 -0.59 0.67
Total 0.30(1.36) 0.68(1.29) 0.39(0.18) -0.70(0.10) -0.71(0.13) 0.64(0.48)
Notes: The naming of the decomposition components is consistent with section 2. The numbers in
the table are percentages. The TFP measures are obtained from estimating value added production
functions at the two-digit level, additional information on these estimations is provided in appendix
B. The decomposition is based on a sample of about 55.000 firms of the Belgian services sector.
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6.6 Additional Information
Table 9: Number of incumbent, entering and exiting firms
Year Incumbent firms Entering firms Exiting firms
1997 29871 3192 1687
1998 31376 2000 1803
1999 31573 1974 1796
2000 31751 1956 1782
2001 31925 1866 1649
2002 32142 2010 1407
2003 32745 2171 1200
2004 33716 2143 1075
2005 34784 2542 983
2006 36343 2707 1003
2007 38047 2808 1158
2008 39697 3119 1196
2009 41620 3055 1116
2010 43559 2955 1132
2011 45382 3563 1290
2012 47655 3562 1438
2013 49779 2860 2084
2014 50555 3314
Notes: The year of entry is defined as the first year of economic
activity and the year of exit as the last year of economic activity.
We are unable to distinguish mergers and acquisitions from entry
and exit, see Geurts (2015) for a discussion on this issue.
Table 10: Covariances between market share and productivity
Year Cov(TFP,MS)surv Cov(TFP,MS)entry Cov(TFP,MS)exit
1997 0.06 0.04 0.21
1998 0.07 0.00 0.11
1999 0.08 0.05 0.19
2000 0.09 0.04 0.24
2001 0.11 -0.01 0.27
2002 0.12 -0.04 0.46
2003 0.12 0.04 0.19
2004 0.13 0.06 0.26
2005 0.14 0.05 0.12
2006 0.14 0.08 0.26
2007 0.13 -0.01 0.29
2008 0.13 -0.00 0.26
2009 0.15 0.02 0.71
2010 0.14 0.00 0.23
2011 0.13 0.05 0.25
2012 0.15 0.04 0.15
2013 0.15 0.05 0.26
2014 0.17 0.13
Total 0.12 0.03 0.24
Notes: The covariance for the exiting firms is for the firms that
exit in t, and hence is included in the calculation for productivity
growth between t and t+1. The covariances from this table should
not be compared to those reported in figure (12). The covariances
reported in this table are calculated based on the entire sample,
while those reported in figure (12) are calculated at the indus-
try level and aggregated afterwards, which explains why they are
substantially higher.
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7 Figures
Figure 1: Recession periods Belgium
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Notes: Data on the evolution of GDP in Belgium was obtained from the economic
indicators published by the National Bank of Belgium. The gray areas represent
recession periods, i.e. periods in which GDP growth was negative for two consec-
utive quarters. Over our sample period, there were three such periods: Q1-2001 -
Q4-2001; Q3-2008 - Q2-2009; Q2-2012 - Q1-2013.
Figure 2: TFP evolution Belgium economy
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Figure 3: Scatterplots TFP and Jobs
Notes: Scatter plots of TFP and Jobs (both in natural logarithms). Jobs are expressed in hours worked. The
dashed lines are the averages of productivity and # jobs. The covariance between productivity and # jobs
increases when more firms move towards the first and third quadrant of these scatter plots. Note that simply
regarding changes in covariances does not allow to distinguish between changes in TFP and changes in #
jobs.
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Figure 4: Job reallocation - In Hours Worked
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Job Reallocation in incumbent firms
Notes: Job reallocation measures are based on changes in hours effectively worked,
so job flows represent changes actual time worked (see section B.3.2 for a discus-
sion). Job creation, job destruction and gross job reallocation are constructed as
in Davis and Haltiwanger (1992).
Figure 5: Job reallocation - In FTE’s
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Notes: Job reallocation measures are based on changes in full time equivalents, so
job flows represent changes in the number of registered employees expressed in full
time equivalents (see section B.3.2 for a discussion). Job creation, job destruction
and gross job reallocation are constructed as in Davis and Haltiwanger (1992).
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Figure 6: Economy-wide decomposition MP - Incumbent firms
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Notes: This graph plots the numbers from table (2).
Figure 7: Economy-wide decomposition MP - Entering and ex-
iting firms
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Notes: This graph plots the numbers from table (2).
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Figure 8: FHK - Incumbent firms
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Notes: This graph plots the numbers from table (3).
Figure 9: FHK - Entering and exiting firms
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Notes: This graph plots the numbers from table (3).
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Figure 10: Industry decomposition MP - Incumbent firms
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Notes: This graph plots the numbers from table (4).
Figure 11: Industry decomposition MP - Entering and exiting
firms
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Notes: This graph plots the numbers from table (4).
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Figure 12: Covariance between job changes and productivity
changes
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Notes: Inter and intra industry covariances between jobs and productivity.
Figure 13: Cleansing in manufacturing vs. services
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Notes: This graph plots the difference in the covariance component
of the MP decomposition, i.e. ∆Cov(TFP,MS)surv,manufacturing −
∆Cov(TFP,MS)surv,services, and the difference in the between component of the
FHK decomposition, i.e. ∆Betweensurv,manufacturing−∆Betweensurv,services.
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Figure 14: Entry and Exit in sample
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Notes: This graph shows entry and exit expressed relative to the number of active
firms in a year. These figures are based on our sample for the decompositions, so
after having removed firms that report badly or report negative value added since
such observations cannot be used in the decompositions.
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8 Appendix
A Robustness checks
The main body of the paper presents results that are based on value added productivity measures, which are aggregated with
market shares expressed in hours worked. As argumented, these productivity and aggregation measures are most appropriate
for the insights we pursue in this paper. This section presents some robustness checks by making the same decompositions
based on alternative productivity and weighting measures.
A.1 Translog production function
The translog production function is more flexible than the standard Cobb Douglas production function since it does not
impose separability between the inputs of the production function by including interaction terms between inputs. Moreover,
the functional form of this production function is more flexible as it allows the elasticities to vary between firms. See section
B.2 for more information on the estimation.
Table A1: MP decomposition - NACE 1-74
Surviving firms Entering firms Exiting firms
4 TFP surv 4 Cov(TFP,MS)surv TFP entrt−survt Cov(TFP,MS)entryt−survt TFP survt−1−exitt−1 Cov(TFP,MS)survt−1−exitt−1
Year 4 TFP
1998 -0.14 -1.66 1.13 -0.15 0.52 1.37 -1.35
1999 3.61 0.80 1.85 -0.05 0.59 1.16 -0.74
2000 2.80 0.23 1.70 0.03 0.39 1.41 -0.96
2001 2.63 -0.84 2.70 0.10 0.51 1.54 -1.39
2002 1.58 -0.33 1.60 0.04 0.40 1.46 -1.59
2003 2.63 0.42 2.17 0.26 0.58 1.33 -2.13
2004 3.04 -0.17 2.24 0.13 0.45 1.19 -0.79
2005 2.09 0.31 1.11 0.09 0.50 0.68 -0.61
2006 3.47 1.46 0.35 0.06 0.70 0.79 0.10
2007 3.15 1.70 0.44 -0.06 0.55 0.71 -0.18
2008 -0.54 -2.10 0.44 0.01 0.56 0.84 -0.29
2009 5.09 0.88 3.58 -0.06 0.58 0.72 -0.59
2010 0.61 0.43 0.07 -0.06 0.43 0.79 -1.05
2011 -0.70 -0.95 -0.10 -0.20 0.62 0.54 -0.61
2012 -0.29 -2.23 1.56 -0.15 0.60 0.58 -0.66
2013 1.35 0.13 0.74 -0.03 0.39 0.51 -0.39
2014 1.74 -0.97 2.69 -0.16 0.72 0.46 -1.00
Total 1.89(1.66) -0.17(1.15) 1.43(1.04) -0.01(0.12) 0.53(0.10) 0.95(0.37) -0.84(0.55)
Notes: The naming of the decomposition components is consistent with section 2. The numbers in the table are percent-
ages. The TFP measures are obtained from estimating value added production functions at the two-digit level, additional
information on these estimations is provided in appendix B. The decomposition is based on a sample of about 80.000
firms of the Belgian private sector.
Table A2: FHK decomposition - NACE 1-74
Surviving firms
4 Withinsurv 4 Betweensurv 4 Covariancesurv
Year 4 TFP Entry Exit
1998 -0.14 0.31 0.03 -0.86 0.37 0.02
1999 3.61 1.75 1.49 -0.63 0.59 0.40
2000 2.80 1.31 1.26 -0.67 0.46 0.44
2001 2.63 1.27 1.18 -0.62 0.64 0.15
2002 1.58 0.39 1.54 -0.69 0.46 -0.13
2003 2.63 1.55 1.58 -0.59 0.87 -0.78
2004 3.04 1.31 1.30 -0.58 0.62 0.38
2005 2.09 0.80 1.18 -0.58 0.63 0.07
2006 3.47 1.61 0.83 -0.66 0.81 0.88
2007 3.15 1.74 1.01 -0.64 0.54 0.51
2008 -0.54 -1.75 0.68 -0.57 0.55 0.54
2009 5.09 1.51 3.41 -0.55 0.60 0.12
2010 0.61 0.23 0.87 -0.61 0.37 -0.25
2011 -0.70 -1.34 0.97 -0.66 0.40 -0.07
2012 -0.29 -1.45 1.47 -0.68 0.43 -0.07
2013 1.35 0.41 1.14 -0.71 0.38 0.12
2014 1.74 1.27 1.12 -0.71 0.59 -0.53
Total 1.89(1.66) 0.64(1.15) 1.24(0.67) -0.65(0.07) 0.55(0.15) 0.11(0.41)
Notes: The naming of the decomposition components is consistent with
section 2. The numbers in the table are percentages. The TFP measures
are obtained from estimating value added production functions at the
two-digit level, additional information on these estimations is provided
in appendix B. The decomposition is based on a sample of about 80.000
firms of the Belgian private sector.
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A.2 Labor Productivity
Given our interest in the relation between job flows and productivity, we also include the decomposition results for labor
productivity measures. We define labor productivity as the ratio of value added to the number of hours effectively worked,
hence this measure disregards the role of capital in the production process. Nevertheless, it is an intuitive measure of firm
performance that does not require to estimate production functions and hence is not subject to potential biases originating
therefrom.
Table A3: MP decomposition - NACE 1-74
Surviving firms Entering firms Exiting firms
4 LP surv 4 Cov(LP,MS)surv LP entrt−survt Cov(LP,MS)entryt−survt LP survt−1−exitt−1 Cov(LP,MS)survt−1−exitt−1
Year 4 LP
1998 0.46 -2.60 2.64 -0.17 -0.29 1.13 -0.26
1999 1.96 -0.05 1.61 -0.13 -0.22 0.93 -0.18
2000 1.55 -0.68 1.57 -0.06 -0.27 1.16 -0.17
2001 1.49 -1.76 2.86 -0.08 -0.32 1.22 -0.43
2002 0.98 -1.11 1.49 -0.09 -0.32 1.24 -0.23
2003 1.92 -0.21 1.55 -0.04 -0.36 1.20 -0.22
2004 1.11 -1.08 1.88 -0.04 -0.34 1.03 -0.34
2005 0.76 -0.11 0.62 -0.04 -0.42 0.75 -0.04
2006 1.01 0.51 0.47 -0.05 -0.46 0.84 -0.31
2007 1.01 0.55 0.47 0.00 -0.45 0.70 -0.25
2008 -2.01 -3.05 0.97 -0.04 -0.48 0.81 -0.21
2009 1.65 0.61 1.05 -0.11 -0.49 0.75 -0.16
2010 -1.07 -0.31 0.23 -0.09 -0.52 0.93 -1.31
2011 -2.12 -2.08 -0.04 -0.08 -0.49 0.62 -0.04
2012 -1.75 -3.01 1.27 -0.07 -0.49 0.59 -0.04
2013 0.48 0.17 0.24 -0.11 -0.40 0.55 0.03
2014 0.97 -0.81 1.92 -0.27 -0.54 0.69 -0.02
Total 0.49(1.36) -0.88(1.22) 1.22(0.84) -0.09(0.06) -0.40(0.10) 0.89(0.24) -0.25(0.30)
Notes: The naming of the decomposition components is consistent with section 2. The numbers in the table are percentages. The TFP measures
are obtained from estimating value added production functions at the two-digit level, additional information on these estimations is provided in
appendix B. The decomposition is based on a sample of about 80.000 firms of the Belgian private sector.
Table A4: FHK decomposition - NACE 1-74
Surviving firms
4 Withinsurv 4 Betweensurv 4 Covariancesurv
Year 4 LP Entry Exit
1998 0.46 0.18 1.34 -1.46 -0.45 0.84
1999 1.96 1.67 1.03 -1.16 -0.31 0.72
2000 1.55 1.12 1.03 -1.26 -0.30 0.96
2001 1.49 1.26 0.99 -1.16 -0.36 0.75
2002 0.98 0.66 0.95 -1.22 -0.39 0.97
2003 1.92 1.78 0.65 -1.10 -0.36 0.94
2004 1.11 1.25 0.64 -1.09 -0.35 0.67
2005 0.76 0.86 0.73 -1.08 -0.44 0.69
2006 1.01 1.60 0.58 -1.22 -0.47 0.51
2007 1.01 1.64 0.59 -1.23 -0.42 0.44
2008 -2.01 -1.66 0.77 -1.16 -0.55 0.59
2009 1.65 2.13 0.70 -1.19 -0.56 0.58
2010 -1.07 0.53 0.64 -1.25 -0.61 -0.38
2011 -2.12 -1.20 0.57 -1.46 -0.60 0.57
2012 -1.75 -1.27 0.92 -1.35 -0.58 0.54
2013 0.48 0.86 0.98 -1.43 -0.49 0.57
2014 0.97 1.72 0.82 -1.46 -0.76 0.65
Total 0.49(1.36) 0.77(1.15) 0.82(0.21) -1.25(0.13) -0.47(0.13) 0.62(0.30)
Notes: The naming of the decomposition components is consistent with section 2. The numbers
in the table are percentages. The TFP measures are obtained from estimating value added pro-
duction functions at the two-digit level, additional information on these estimations is provided
in appendix B. The decomposition is based on a sample of about 80.000 firms of the Belgian
private sector.
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A.3 Weighting with FTE’s
The tables below show results for jobs measured by full time equivalents instead of hours worked (see section B.3.2 for a
discussion).
Table A5: MP decomposition - NACE 1-74
Surviving firms Entering firms Exiting firms
4 TFP surv 4 Cov(TFP,MS)surv TFP entrt−survt Cov(TFP,MS)entryt−survt TFP survt−1−exitt−1 Cov(TFP,MS)survt−1−exitt−1
Year 4 TFP
1998 -0.23 -1.73 1.63 -0.38 -0.11 1.19 -0.82
1999 2.30 0.86 1.03 -0.38 -0.05 0.94 -0.11
2000 1.96 0.40 1.20 -0.31 -0.09 1.16 -0.40
2001 1.96 -0.78 2.50 -0.28 -0.19 1.30 -0.60
2002 1.13 -0.18 1.06 -0.26 -0.25 1.36 -0.61
2003 1.81 0.56 1.55 -0.14 -0.14 1.14 -1.17
2004 2.01 -0.11 1.58 -0.17 -0.15 1.03 -0.17
2005 0.70 0.33 0.27 -0.22 -0.16 0.70 -0.22
2006 1.87 1.56 -0.17 -0.26 -0.10 0.76 0.07
2007 1.31 1.80 -0.35 -0.24 -0.27 0.61 -0.24
2008 -1.81 -1.98 0.26 -0.29 -0.27 0.73 -0.26
2009 1.66 0.95 0.78 -0.34 -0.23 0.69 -0.20
2010 -0.05 0.68 0.16 -0.31 -0.28 0.90 -1.19
2011 -1.04 -0.67 -0.16 -0.40 -0.19 0.55 -0.17
2012 -1.00 -2.06 1.17 -0.35 -0.21 0.61 -0.16
2013 1.14 0.54 0.47 -0.21 -0.18 0.52 0.00
2014 2.10 -0.19 2.38 -0.35 -0.11 0.66 -0.30
Total 0.93(1.28) -0.00(1.14) 0.90(0.86) -0.29(0.08) -0.18(0.07) 0.87(0.28) -0.38(0.37)
Notes: The naming of the decomposition components is consistent with section 2. The numbers in the table are percentages. The TFP measures
are obtained from estimating value added production functions at the two-digit level, additional information on these estimations is provided in
appendix B. The decomposition is based on a sample of about 80.000 firms of the Belgian private sector.
Table A6: FHK decomposition - NACE 1-74
Surviving firms
4 Withinsurv 4 Betweensurv 4 Covariancesurv
Year 4 TFP Entry Exit
1998 -0.23 0.02 0.21 -0.32 -0.50 0.35
1999 2.30 1.74 0.38 -0.24 -0.38 0.80
2000 1.96 1.40 0.48 -0.29 -0.37 0.74
2001 1.96 1.44 0.47 -0.19 -0.44 0.67
2002 1.13 0.63 0.58 -0.33 -0.48 0.72
2003 1.81 1.64 0.70 -0.25 -0.25 -0.03
2004 2.01 1.33 0.42 -0.30 -0.28 0.83
2005 0.70 0.51 0.41 -0.33 -0.36 0.47
2006 1.87 1.73 0.02 -0.39 -0.31 0.82
2007 1.31 1.72 0.03 -0.33 -0.48 0.36
2008 -1.81 -1.55 0.15 -0.28 -0.59 0.46
2009 1.66 1.43 0.50 -0.24 -0.52 0.48
2010 -0.05 0.79 0.39 -0.37 -0.58 -0.28
2011 -1.04 -0.83 0.47 -0.46 -0.60 0.38
2012 -1.00 -1.16 0.66 -0.38 -0.56 0.44
2013 1.14 0.73 0.65 -0.39 -0.36 0.52
2014 2.10 1.86 0.68 -0.40 -0.39 0.36
Total 0.93(1.28) 0.79(1.08) 0.42(0.21) -0.32(0.07) -0.44(0.11) 0.48(0.30)
Notes: The naming of the decomposition components is consistent with section 2. The numbers
in the table are percentages. The TFP measures are obtained from estimating value added pro-
duction functions at the two-digit level, additional information on these estimations is provided
in appendix B. The decomposition is based on a sample of about 80.000 firms of the Belgian
private sector.
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A.4 Extended MP Decomposition
A.4.1 Translog
Table A7: MP decomposition - Industry to Sector - NACE 1-74
Surviving firms Entering firms Exiting firms
4 TFP surv 4 Intra Ind Cov(TFP,MS)surv 4 Inter ind Cov(TFP,MS)surv Intra Indentrt−survt Inter Indentrt−survt Intra Indsurvt−1−exitt−1 Inter Indsurvt−1−exitt−1
Year 4 TFP
1998 -0.14 -1.66 0.83 0.29 -0.54 0.91 0.83 -0.82
1999 3.61 0.80 0.35 1.50 -0.48 1.01 0.81 -0.40
2000 2.80 0.23 0.29 1.41 -0.42 0.84 0.95 -0.50
2001 2.63 -0.84 1.09 1.60 -0.39 1.01 0.83 -0.68
2002 1.58 -0.33 0.71 0.88 -0.45 0.89 0.75 -0.89
2003 2.63 0.42 0.18 1.98 -0.39 1.23 0.69 -1.49
2004 3.04 -0.17 0.31 1.93 -0.40 0.97 0.61 -0.22
2005 2.09 0.31 0.35 0.76 -0.49 1.09 0.73 -0.67
2006 3.47 1.46 -0.06 0.42 -0.62 1.37 0.61 0.29
2007 3.15 1.70 -0.00 0.44 -0.49 0.98 0.47 0.05
2008 -0.54 -2.10 0.80 -0.36 -0.58 1.15 0.44 0.11
2009 5.09 0.88 0.32 3.26 -0.63 1.14 0.56 -0.43
2010 0.61 0.43 -0.42 0.49 -0.63 1.00 -0.96 0.70
2011 -0.70 -0.95 -0.29 0.19 -0.63 1.05 0.48 -0.55
2012 -0.29 -2.23 0.66 0.90 -0.58 1.02 0.46 -0.53
2013 1.35 0.13 0.37 0.37 -0.48 0.84 0.54 -0.41
2014 1.74 -0.97 1.48 1.21 -0.70 1.26 0.52 -1.06
Total 1.89(1.66) -0.17(1.15) 0.41(0.48) 1.02(0.87) -0.52(0.10) 1.05(0.15) 0.55(0.42) -0.44(0.52)
Notes: The naming of the decomposition components is consistent with section 2. The numbers in the table are percentages. The TFP measures
are obtained from estimating value added production functions at the two-digit level, additional information on these estimations is provided in
appendix B. The decomposition is based on a sample of about 80.000 firms of the Belgian private sector.
A.4.2 Labor Productivity
Table A8: MP decomposition - Industry to Sector - NACE 1-74
Surviving firms Entering firms Exiting firms
4 LP surv 4 Intra Ind Cov(LP,MS)surv 4 Inter ind Cov(LP,MS)surv Intra Indentrt−survt Inter Indentrt−survt Intra Indsurvt−1−exitt−1 Inter Indsurvt−1−exitt−1
Year 4 LP
1998 0.46 -2.60 1.52 1.12 -0.33 -0.13 0.79 0.09
1999 1.96 -0.05 0.83 0.77 -0.26 -0.09 0.65 0.10
2000 1.55 -0.68 0.79 0.78 -0.21 -0.12 0.85 0.14
2001 1.49 -1.76 1.78 1.08 -0.20 -0.19 0.72 0.06
2002 0.98 -1.11 1.47 0.01 -0.24 -0.18 0.75 0.26
2003 1.92 -0.21 0.83 0.73 -0.19 -0.21 0.73 0.25
2004 1.11 -1.08 0.99 0.88 -0.17 -0.20 0.57 0.11
2005 0.76 -0.11 0.68 -0.06 -0.23 -0.23 0.55 0.16
2006 1.01 0.51 0.65 -0.18 -0.28 -0.22 0.52 0.00
2007 1.01 0.55 0.74 -0.26 -0.21 -0.23 0.43 0.02
2008 -2.01 -3.05 1.48 -0.52 -0.29 -0.23 0.47 0.13
2009 1.65 0.61 0.81 0.24 -0.35 -0.25 0.50 0.09
2010 -1.07 -0.31 0.24 -0.01 -0.40 -0.20 -0.51 0.13
2011 -2.12 -2.08 0.44 -0.48 -0.35 -0.22 0.46 0.12
2012 -1.75 -3.01 1.20 0.08 -0.33 -0.23 0.44 0.10
2013 0.48 0.17 0.22 0.03 -0.28 -0.22 0.48 0.10
2014 0.97 -0.81 1.24 0.68 -0.52 -0.28 0.48 0.19
Total 0.49(1.36) -0.88(1.22) 0.94(0.45) 0.29(0.54) -0.28(0.09) -0.20(0.05) 0.52(0.30) 0.12(0.07)
Notes: The naming of the decomposition components is consistent with section 2. The numbers in the table are percentages. The TFP measures
are obtained from estimating value added production functions at the two-digit level, additional information on these estimations is provided in
appendix B. The decomposition is based on a sample of about 80.000 firms of the Belgian private sector.
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A.4.3 Weighting with FTE’s
Table A9: MP decomposition - Industry to Sector - NACE 1-74
Surviving firms Entering firms Exiting firms
4 TFP surv 4 Intra Ind Cov(TFP,MS)surv 4 Inter ind Cov(TFP,MS)surv Intra Indentrt−survt Inter Indentrt−survt Intra Indsurvt−1−exitt−1 Inter Indsurvt−1−exitt−1
Year 4 TFP
1998 -0.23 -1.73 0.51 1.12 -0.71 0.21 0.62 -0.25
1999 2.30 0.86 0.48 0.56 -0.60 0.16 0.71 0.12
2000 1.96 0.40 0.53 0.67 -0.55 0.15 0.89 -0.12
2001 1.96 -0.78 1.61 0.90 -0.56 0.08 0.63 0.07
2002 1.13 -0.18 0.92 0.14 -0.61 0.10 0.59 0.16
2003 1.81 0.56 0.35 1.20 -0.55 0.27 0.38 -0.41
2004 2.01 -0.11 0.45 1.14 -0.57 0.25 0.50 0.35
2005 0.70 0.33 0.29 -0.02 -0.64 0.25 0.40 0.08
2006 1.87 1.56 0.26 -0.44 -0.62 0.27 0.63 0.21
2007 1.31 1.80 0.21 -0.55 -0.70 0.18 0.42 -0.05
2008 -1.81 -1.98 1.04 -0.77 -0.78 0.22 0.48 -0.01
2009 1.66 0.95 0.28 0.50 -0.80 0.23 0.52 -0.03
2010 -0.05 0.68 -0.07 0.22 -0.79 0.20 -0.40 0.12
2011 -1.04 -0.67 0.25 -0.41 -0.83 0.24 0.51 -0.12
2012 -1.00 -2.06 0.95 0.22 -0.78 0.22 0.49 -0.04
2013 1.14 0.54 0.32 0.15 -0.61 0.22 0.58 -0.06
2014 2.10 -0.19 1.53 0.84 -0.84 0.38 0.53 -0.17
Total 0.93(1.28) -0.00(1.14) 0.58(0.47) 0.32(0.62) -0.68(0.11) 0.21(0.07) 0.50(0.26) -0.01(0.18)
Notes: The naming of the decomposition components is consistent with section 2. The numbers in the table are percentages. The TFP measures
are obtained from estimating value added production functions at the two-digit level, additional information on these estimations is provided in
appendix B. The decomposition is based on a sample of about 80.000 firms of the Belgian private sector.
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B Semiparametric estimation of production functions
The main body of the paper primarily focuses on decomposing aggregate productivity since this
is the main instrument to answer the research questions. The focus of this section is on how to
obtain the inputs of the decompositions, namely the firm level TFP estimates. In following order
we introduce the estimation procedure, elaborate on appropriate data counterparts and present the
production function coefficient estimates for each industry.
B.1 Value added production function
In order to obtain productivity measures, we will rely on production functions in which we explicitly
assume a functional form for technology. Like many papers in the productivity literature, we rely
on a Cobb-Douglas production function to describe the transformation of inputs into outputs. More
specifically, output (Y ) is generated by two inputs: labor (L) and capital (K), and by the state
variable productivity (TFP). These inputs characterize a value added production function. We
choose for a value added production function since our data and research objectives favor the use of
value added productivity measures (see section B.3.1). The value added Cobb-Douglas production
function is given by:
Yijt = TFPijt ∗ Lβljijt ∗Kβkjijt (1)
In which the subscript i refers to firm, j to industry and t to year. TFPijt represents the productivity
of firm i in industry j at year t and Lijt, Kijt are the firm’s labor and capital inputs. βlj and βkj
are the elasticities of labor and capital. These β-coefficients are indexed by j, indicating that the
production function is estimated per industry, in our case at the two-digit level. It is assumed that
all firms within an industry have the same technology parameters. Moreover, the Cobb-Douglas
production function imposes all TFP differences to be Hicks neutral. In order to estimate this
production function, consider the log-linearized transformation:
yijt = βlj ∗ lijt + βkj ∗ kijt + tfpijt + ijt (2)
With small letters indicating natural logarithms. The ijt in this equation is the true exogenous
residual output, both for the firm and the econometrician. It contains measurement error and
unexpected events to which firms do not react, e.g. bad weather, unforeseen machine breakdowns
and strikes.1 Equations (1) and (2) fundamentally define TFP as the residual in output that is
known by the firm but not observed by the econometrician ex ante. In non-econometric terms, TFP
is the output that cannot be explained by the return from the capital and labor inputs. Rewriting
equation (2) easily allows to obtain the natural logarithm of TFPijt, which is the input of our
decompositions2:
tfpijt = yijt − βlj ∗ lijt − βkj ∗ kijt − ijt (3)
From equation (3) if follows that we need estimates for βlj , βkj and ijt in order to calculate tfpijt. In
a moment we show how to obtain ˆijt. The crux of the matter is to obtain unbiased estimates for βlj
1Note that we do not include a constant in equation (2). More accurate would be to write TFPijt = β0j+tfpijt+
ijt in which β0j is the average productivity level of all firms in industry j, tfpijt is the firm specific deviation from
this average productivity and ijt the true exogenous error. In our analysis, we absorb β0j in tfpijt.
2The exponential of this natural logarithm returns TFP in levels. In the literature it is typical to use and de-
compose weighted average logarithmic productivity measures. Our decomposition methodology would require mod-
ification when using levels as inputs. See appendix Melitz and Polanec (2015) for more information and Petrin and
Levinsohn (2012) for a further discussion on this topic.
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and βkj . Relying on ordinary least squares to obtain estimates for these coefficients is inappropriate
because of the well-known problem of endogeneity from a simultaneity bias (Marschak and Andrews,
1944). Firms potentially adapt their use of inputs (lijt, kijt) in function of the tfpijt-part of the
residual. This causes biased estimates of βlj and βkj , which in its turn prevents identification of
tfpijt. The idea of semiparametric estimation methods is to overcome the potential simultaneity
bias by looking at other firm-specific variables that signal firm-specific information -related to their
productivity- to the econometrician. The model of Olley and Pakes (1996, hereafter OP) introduced
this insight. According to their model, investments can be used to infer the productivity of a firm.3
Under relatively mild conditions, it can be shown that investments are a monotonically increasing
function of productivity, conditional on capital:
invijt = ft(kijt, tfpijt) (4)
Given the strict monotonicity assumption, the inverse of this investment function can then be used
in equation (2) to proxy for tfpijt under the condition that tfpijt is the only unobservable that
enters the investment function:
yijt = βlj ∗ lijt + βkj ∗ kijt + f−1t (kijt, invijt) + ijt (5)
The functional form of f−1t (kijt, invijt) can be very complicated as it has to hold for all firms
in the industry, regardless of their characteristics. Therefore, this function is usually treated non-
parametrically. In practice this boils down to substituting tfpijt with a third or fourth order poly-
nomial of kijt and invijt. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003, hereafter LP) argue that it is better to
use materials as a proxy variable for unobserved productivity since investments are often zero or
lumpy reported. However, due to limited reporting in our data, we rely on investments as proxy
variable. Since the inverse of the investment function proxies for unobserved productivity, equation
(5) simply allows to identify ˆijt as the remaining residual of this equation. According to the model
of OP, equation (5) also allows to obtain an unbiased estimate of βlj since they assume labor to
be a flexible non-dynamic input that is chosen each period and has no impact on future output
of the firm. Furthermore their model assumes capital to be a dynamic input that is subject to an
investment process. Capital at t is determined at t−1 and it takes one period for capital to become
productive. Under these assumptions, equation (5) allows unbiased identification of βlj since there
is no simultaneity between the choice of labor and the other variables in equation. Ackerberg et al.
(2015, hereafter ACF) argue that the flexible input assumption of labor is problematic. This is
indeed arguable, especially for a rather rigid labor market like the one in Belgium.4 To identify the
labor coefficient, they propose to rely on the same assumption as OP and LP use for the identifica-
tion of the capital coefficient, which is that productivity evolves according to a first order Markov
process:
tfpijt = E[tfpijt|Iijt−1] + ξijt = E[tfpijt|tfpijt−1] + ξijt (6)
In which Iijt−1 is the information set of the firm at t − 1. This assumption implies that a firm’s
expectations on future productivity only depend on its current productivity. So by assumption all
elements of Iijt−1 are orthogonal to ξijt, which is the unexpected innovation in productivity. Since
3An important assumption of the OP methodology is that investments become part of the capital stock after one
period. Section B.3.3 expands on the construction of the capital stock and investments.
4If labor would be chosen before investments, it would become part of the investment function: invijt =
ft(lijt, kijt, tfpijt). It is obvious that in this scenario, the equivalent of equation (5) would not allow identifica-
tion of βl.
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kijt is actually decided at t − 1, it is in Iijt−1. Although lijt is not in Iijt−1 since it is decided at
t (OP,LP) or between t− 1 and t (ACF), lijt−1 can be used as an instrument for lijt since it is in
Iijt−1. Together, these form the following moment conditions:
E
[
ξijt(βlj , βkj)·
(
kijt
lijt−1
)]
= 0 (7)
ACF use the sample analogue of these moment conditions to obtain consistent estimates for the
capital and labor coefficients. Practically, this can be done by estimating equation (5) to obtain
ˆijt and initial values for βˆlj and βˆkj , which allows to construct an initial estimate for tfpijt
from equation (3). Non-parametric regression of t̂fpijt on t̂fpijt−1 then returns an estimate for
ξijt(βlj , βkj). These estimates can be used to bring the sample analogue of equation (7) as close to
zero as possible, through which consistent estimates for βlj and βkj are found. Wooldridge (2009)
showed how this set of assumptions also allows to obtain coefficient estimates for βlj and βkj
with a one step GMM estimator that is more efficient, does not require bootstrapping to obtain
standard errors and capitalizes more from the orthogonality of ijt. When applying the Markov
process-assumption on the evolution of productivity to equation (5) we obtain:
yijt = βlj ∗ lijt + βkj ∗ kijt + f−1t (kijt−1, invijt−1) + ξijt + ijt (8)
In this equation there is no simultaneity bias since the proxy for unobserved productivity now
consists of a non-parametric function of the lag of capital and the lag of investments. Moreover, kijt
is orthogonal to ξijt and ijt. Although labor is uncorrelated with ijt, it will be correlated with ξijt
if it has a dynamic nature and is chosen between t− 1 and t. This can be solved by instrumenting
lijt with lijt−1. In practice, equation (8) allows to obtain consistent coefficient estimates by using
pooled IV in which the labor variable is instrumented with its lag, the capital variable serves as
its own instrument and the non-parametric function is modeled as a fourth order polynomial in
the lags of capital and investments. Since the Wooldridge (2009) procedure is very pragmatic, it
is our preferred method to estimate production functions. In conclusion, tfpijt can be retrieved
by estimating equation (5) to obtain ˆijt and equation (8) to obtain βˆlj and βˆkj . Substituting
these estimates into equation (3) returns firm level TFP estimates. In practice, we deviate from
this procedure by ignoring the true exogenous error. Given our interest in aggregate productivity,
we aim to obtain TFP estimates for a sample as large as possible. Following the procedure above
requires reporting on value added, labor, capital and investments. However, due to the definition
of investments, there are no investments available in the first year of the sample. If we would
furthermore drop the firms for which investments are not available in a certain year, we end up
loosing 30% of our sample. Moreover, as theoretically expected, ˆijt is on average zero in our
sample. Therefore, we choose to use TFP measures that also include ijt. Since this approach does
not require data on investments to calculate TFP measures, this allows using a larger and more
representative sample.5,6
5Note that data on investments is required to estimate the production function. However, once the labor and
capital coefficients are calculated at the industry level, we can use these to calculate firm level TFP measures for all
firms that report value added, labor and capital.
6We did our analyses on the sample for which we have investments reported for all years with and without
correction for the true exogenous error and the findings are robust.
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B.2 Gross output and Translog production function
Since gross output and translog production functions are used in robustness checks (see section A),
we briefly expand on how these are estimated. The same set of assumptions and the Wooldridge
(2009) estimator, which were introduced for the Cobb-Douglas production function in the previous
section, again underlie the estimation procedure.
Gross output - The gross output production function differs from the value added production
function by including intermediate inputs (mijt) as input in the production function. The inclusion
of intermediate inputs on top of labor and capital precludes one from assuming a fixed proportion of
intermediate inputs for a unit of output. In value added production functions, firms cannot increase
output by increasing intermediate inputs, conditional on labor, capital and productivity, i.e. value
added production functions are Leontief in intermediate inputs. Gross output production functions
are more flexible in this regard.7 The equivalent of equation (8) is then:
yijt = βlj ∗ lijt + βkj ∗ kijt + βmj ∗mijt + f−1t (kijt−1, invijt−1) + ξijt + ijt (9)
In which yijt now represents gross output instead of value added. We follow LP and ACF in their
timing assumptions. Intermediate inputs are modeled as flexible inputs that are chosen at time t.
Hence equation (9) does not suffer from simultaneity issues and allows identification of βmj . As in
the value added case, this equation is estimated with pooled IV in which labor is instrumented with
its lag. Capital and materials serve as their own instruments and the proxy function for unobserved
productivity is modeled with a fourth order polynomial in lagged capital and investments.8 The
coefficient estimates from this equation can then be used to calculate tfpijt
9:
tfpijt = yijt − βˆlj ∗ lijt − βˆkj ∗ kijt − βˆmj ∗mijt (10)
Translog - The translog production function is a generalisation of the Cobb-Douglas production
function. It does not impose separability between the inputs of the production function by including
interaction terms between inputs. Moreover, the functional form of this production function is more
flexible as it allows the elasticities to vary between firms. The Translog equivalent of equation (8)
is given by:
yijt = βl1j∗lijt+βl2j∗l2ijt+βk1j∗kijt+βk2j∗k2ijt+βlkj∗kijt∗lijt+f−1t (kijt−1, invijt−1)+ξijt+ijt (11)
The same timing assumptions as in the previous section apply. Hence by using a pooled IV estimator
in which labor is instrumented with its lag and capital serves as its own instrument, consistent
coefficient estimates can be obtained. To obtain firm level TFP estimates, hese can subsequently
be substituted into the following equation:
tfpijt = yijt − βˆlj ∗ lijt − βˆl2j ∗ l2ijt − βˆkj ∗ kijt − βˆk2j ∗ k2ijt − βˆlkj ∗ lijt ∗ kijt (12)
7This seems to favor the use of gross output production functions. Nonetheless, Bond and So¨derbom (2005)
showed for the Cobb Douglas case and Gandhi et al. for the more general case that the identification of flexible
inputs can be problematic. They argue that gross output production functions cannot be identified without imposing
additional assumptions on the model.
8If one wants to treat intermediate inputs as a dynamic input that is chosen between t− 1 and t, then mijt will
be correlated with part of ξijt and mijt must be instrumented with its lag in order to obtain an unbiased estimate
for βmj .
9Again we ignore the true exogenous error as this does not alter our findings and allows to obtain firm level TFP
estimates for a larger sample. Also for the Translog production function, we will ignore this true exogenous error.
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B.3 Output and inputs of the production function
Our data is mainly from a dataset from the National Bank of Belgium that contains annual accounts
of all firms in Belgium with limited liability. This section presents a detailed overview of the variables
that were selected from this dataset as data counterparts for the variables introduced in Appendix
B.1. Also deflation, data cleaning and specific issues on data with regard to the empirical analysis
are discussed.
B.3.1 Output
Either gross output or value added can be used as output measure in production functions. Gross
output is a measure of the total sales and receipts. At the level of an economy, aggregate gross
output is the sum of sales to final users in the economy (GDP) and sales to other industries (which
then serve as inputs in those industries). Value added can be obtained by subtracting goods and
services purchased from other firms from gross output. Value added includes wages, interest, de-
preciation, rent, taxes and profit. According to the national income identity, aggregate value added
is equal to aggregate final demand because intermediate inputs cancel out in the aggregate. This
means that value added based productivity could be interpreted as a firm’s capacity to contribute to
final demand. Since we are interested in productivity as a determinant of welfare, which is directly
related to aggregate demand, it is intuitive to choose for value added productivity measures. Also
from a practical point of view, only firms that are obliged to report full annual accounts have to
report gross output and this is only a small part of our sample.10 In order to represent the Belgian
economy in our decompositions, it is important to aim for a sample size that is as large as possible.
Our dataset contains net value added.11 Two-digit producer price indices (PPI’s) are used to ob-
tain real values for the outputs. Over the course of our sample period, the industry classification
changed. From 1997-2006 firms are classified in NACE rev. 1.1. and from 2007-2014 in NACE rev.
2. Since the conversion between these two classifications is not a 1:1 relationship, we used a different
deflator for each period and use 2006, the year for which both PPI deflators are available in both
classifications, as base year. For the period 1997-2006, we rely on a two-digit PPI for all industries
from the National Bank of Belgium. For the period 2007-2014, we rely on a two-digit PPI from
Eurostat.
10A firm has to file full annual accounts when the average annual number of employees is higher than 100 or
when at least two of the following thresholds are surpassed: (i) average annual number of employees equal to 50, (ii)
turnover (excluding VAT) e7.300.000, (iii) balance sheet total e3.650.000. Only about 8% of the firms meets these
requirements.
11It also includes gross output measures like turnover (code 70 in the profit and loss account) or operating revenues
(code 70-74 in the profit and loss accounts). Gross output can also be calculated by adding intermediary inputs up
to value added. Doing so increases the number of observations with reported gross output and the correlation of this
constructed gross output measure with reported turnover and operating revenues is respectively 99.7% and 100%.
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B.3.2 Labor
To estimate Total Factor Productivity as well as Labor productivity, one needs an accurate proxy
for labor. Based on the annual accounts of firms, there are three ways to infer the amount of labor a
firm employs. Firms report the personnel costs (code 1023 in the social balance sheet), the number
of full time equivalents (code 9088 in the profit and loss accounts) and the number of hours actually
worked (code 9087 in the profit and loss accounts).
When estimating production functions, it is important that the labor measure truly reflects the
amount of labor employed in the production process. Therefore, it is necessary to carefully examine
what the aforementioned labor measures actually represent. It is important to distinguish between
whether or not being in the personnel register of the firm. All personnel who are under contract
of the firm, are in the personnel register.12 The number of full time equivalents is the sum of all
employees in the personnel register, in which part time employment is aggregated to its full time
equivalent. However, the number of full time equivalents ignores whether or not an employee is
active. So it abstracts from overtime, absence due to sickness, career breaks, unpaid leave, mater-
nity or paternity leave, hours lost due to strikes or other reasons and unemployment because of
economic reasons.13 The number of hours actually worked is solely based on active employees. It
represents the actual number of salaried hours for those that are registered in the personnel register.
Hence this measure is a closer proxy for the amount of labor that is employed in the production
process and contributes to the value created by the firm.14 The personnel costs contain all costs
related to employees who are in the personnel register.15 Since there is substantial heterogeneity in
wages between firms, the link between personnel costs and the amount of labor employed is not as
straightforward as with the number of full time equivalents or the actual number of hours worked.
Also, using personnel costs would bring the additional challenge of finding a deflator that captures
the wage evolution. Therefore, we opt for the actual number of hours worked as labor input in the
production function.
12Note that temporary workers are not in the personnel register as they are not directly under contract of the
firm. Also directors, managers and associates are only in the personnel register if they have a labor contract with the
firm.
13The Belgian law allows firms to temporarily reduce employment without firing employees. The national em-
ployment office then compensates the loss in wage for the employee. During the great recession, firms heavily used
this system to do labor hoarding. Hence the number of full time equivalents would overestimate employment and
underestimate job destruction, especially in times of crisis.
14Although the official guidelines for reporting strictly define the ‘number of hours actually worked’, in practice
some firms report the theoretical number of hours actually worked, which is simply the product of the number of full
time equivalents and the average number of hours worked by one full time equivalent.
15Code 62 of the profit and loss account comprises a wider scope of personnel costs, i.e. also additional reimburse-
ments for personnel on early retirement, costs from unregistered personnel that is hired and employed abroad and
costs from other personnel who are not in the personnel register. Nevertheless, the costs of temporary workers are
not included.
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B.3.3 Capital
Capital serves as an input in the production function. As is standard in the productivity literature,
our measure for the capital input comprises the tangible fixed assets of the firm (codes 22-27 of the
balance sheet). For an extensive discussion on capital inputs for productivity estimations, we refer
to Harper (1999).
To obtain the real capital stock from the nominal values in the annual accounts, we apply the
Perpetual Inventory Method. For the first year that a firm is in the sample, we deflate the book
value of tangible fixed assets with an economy-wide gross fixed capital formation deflator. Thereby
we obtain the real capital stock for the first year. For all subsequent years, we define the real cap-
ital stock as the depreciated sum of the lagged real capital stock and deflated investments. First,
nominal investments are obtained by:
Nominal Investmentt = Nominal Capitalt+NominalDepreciationt−Nominal Capitalt−1 (13)
Depreciations can be found under code 63 in the profit and loss accounts.16 Since our semipara-
metric approach to estimate the production function also makes use of investments, this does not
reduce the number of observations that can be used to estimate the production function. Nominal
investments are then deflated with an economy-wide gross fixed capital formation deflator to obtain
real investments. The real capital stock is then calculated as:
Real Capitalt = (Real Capitalt−1 ∗ (1− δ)) +Real Investmentt (14)
In which the depreciation rate δ =
NominalDepreciationt
Nominal Capitalt +NominalDepreciationt
.
B.3.4 Materials
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) argued that materials are a good proxy for unobserved productivity
in semiparametric estimations of production functions. Unfortunately, only firms that report full
annual accounts are obliged to report materials. Since this is only about 7% percent of the firms,
this reduces the sample size significantly. Therefore, the use of materials is disregarded.
Materials, or more general ‘intermediary inputs’, are goods and services (including energy, raw
materials, semi-finished goods, and services that are purchased from all sources), other than fixed
assets, that are used as inputs into the production process. Codes 60-61 in the profit and loss ac-
counts allow to infer intermediary input use. In order to obtain real values for intermediary inputs,
the same two-digit PPI deflator as for outputs can be used.
16Using firm-year-specific depreciation will induce variation in investments, which is useful for identification of
the capital coefficient when using a one-step estimator for the production function, like we do in this paper.
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B.3.5 Additional information
Given the empirical nature of this paper, it is important to provide sufficient information on how
we dealt with incomplete and implausible reporting in the annual accounts. Therefore, this section
expands on how incomplete accounts for entering and exiting firms are used, how missing data is
imputed and on how potential measurement error and outliers are handled. The empirical analysis
actually can be split into two steps. The first step is to estimate the production function to ob-
tain industry specific capital and labor coefficients that allow to calculate firm level productivity
measures. In a second step, these firm level productivity measures are used in productivity decom-
positions to infer the micro origins of the evolution of aggregate productivity. The sample of firms
is not necessarily the same in these two steps. Once the capital and labor coefficients are obtained,
TFP can be calculated for all firms that report positive value added, labor and capital. However,
for the estimation of the production function also investments must be reported.
Entry and exit - The productivity decomposition includes an entry and exit component. Entry
is defined as a new vat-number that was not in the dataset the year before. Exit is identified from
a vat-number that is not in the dataset and was in there a year before. When firms enter or exit in
the middle of the year, this is reflected in their annual accounts. Especially ‘value added’, ‘materi-
als’ and ‘the effective number of hours worked’ cannot be compared with firms that report annual
accounts based on full-year activity. It is necessary to correct for this, especially with regard to
the productivity decompositions. Not doing so could lead to false conclusions, e.g. TFP (which is
actually residual value added) of entering and exiting firms will be lower simply because these firms
were only active for a couple of months. Ignoring this would probably result in an underestima-
tion of productivity for entering and exiting firms. Therefore, inputs and outputs for entering and
exiting firms are rescaled when their annual accounts are not based on twelve months of activity.
More specifically, the inputs and outputs of entering and exiting firms are rescaled with a factor
‘one divided by the number of months to which the annual account refers times twelve’, e.g. values
for firms that entered six months before they filed their first annual account are multiplied by a
factor two.
Missing data - Firms should file their annual account each year. Nevertheless, it happens occa-
sionally that firms do not report some variables or do not even report their annual accounts at all
in a specific year. This entails issues in the analyses, hence a priori cleaning of the data is required.
We distinguish between the two steps of the empirical analysis, the estimation of production func-
tions and the decompositions. As we estimate loglinear production functions, the estimator will
ignore all observations with negative value added and the observations for which there is missing
data on the labor, capital and investment inputs. The decompositions are manually coded and
require careful data cleaning a priori to avoid biases from outliers and biases from artificial entry
and exit. Obviously, deleting observations with missing data would create artificial entry and exit.
Moreover, a lot of the components in the decompositions are constructed from weighted averages.
As a result, the decompositions are by nature sensitive to outliers in the aggregation measures. Also,
the decomposition uses loglinear productivity and loglinear market share as inputs. This rules out
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firms that report negative value added and firms that are self employed. So it is necessary to clean
the data before doing the decompositions for three sources of bias: artificial entry and exit, outliers
that could drive weighted average measures and inappropriate inputs for loglinear transformations.
Imputation - One solution for the problem of missing data would be to delete the firm completely
from the sample when it does not report one of the necessary variables in a year. However, this is
a very rough solution since the chance that one of the necessary variables is missing in one year
is fairly high given the long time span of our sample. Therefore, we imputed missing values in a
limited number of scenarios. If a variable is not reported in year t but is reported in t− 1 and t+ 1,
we impute the missing variable with the average value of the previous and subsequent year. If a
variable is missing for the first year only, we replace it by the value of the second year of economic
activity. Similarly, if the last year is missing for a variable, we replace it by the last year of economic
activity. If a variable is missing for more than two subsequent years, we delete all the observations
of that firm from our sample. Also when the complete annual account is missing for one year, we
delete all observations of that firm from our sample. Again, not doing so would again create arti-
ficial entry and exit, and bias the aggregate productivity measures so that the components of the
decomposition do not sum up to aggregate growth anymore.
Outliers - All analyses rely on data from annual accounts. It is common practice in the productiv-
ity literature to trim or winsorize the data and the estimated TFP measures to control for biases
resulting from measurement error and to make results robust to outliers. However, there are several
reasons for which we choose not to trim or winsorize the upper and lower percentiles of our data
and TFP estimates. First, it is empirically established that TFP distributions typically have large
tails. However, this does not imply that the TFP measures in the lowest and highest percentiles
result from measurement error. TFP measures in the highest percentiles are typically from very
large firms, for whom the annual accounts likely contain even less measurement error than those of
average sized firms since their annual accounts are filed by professionals. Secondly, these large firms
in the upper percentiles matter for the aggregate productivity of an economy, especially in a small
and open economy like Belgium. Therefore, these firms should be included in research on aggregate
productivity. Thirdly, firms that are in the left tail of the productivity distribution are typically
entrants and exiting firms that have low productivity. Deleting these firms from our sample could
bias the entry and exit components of the productivity decompositions and consequently result in
an overestimation of the contribution from surviving firms to the aggregate productivity evolution.
Measurement error - Of course, outliers that result from measurement errors or mistakes in the
annual accounts must be accounted for. Given the aforementioned sensitivity in productivity de-
compositions from outliers, this is a crucial step in the analysis. We chose to clean our data based
on implausible growth rates for productivity, inputs and outputs. More specifically, we first deleted
firms that report growth rates in employment or value added higher than a factor 10 as we believe
this to be implausible. After removing a small number of firms that report such extreme growth,
we also remove firms that are in the highest or lowest percentile of the yearly growth distribution
of productivity or one of the inputs or outputs. Firms with less than 10 employees were disregarded
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from this cleaning rule since for small firms, growth rates can be relatively large. Also exiting
firms were disregarded as for such firms large declines in inputs and outputs can be expected.
For entering firms, cleaning on growth is not possible since lagged values are not available. Since
we did find implausible observations in entering firms, we deleted the firms in the upper and lower
percentile of the input and output distribution of entering firms for each industry-year combination.
Sample construction - There are about 600.000 firms in our dataset of the National Bank of Belgium
that ranges from 1997-2014. Not all observations can be used, hereby we present a breakdown of
how we obtain our sample. First, there are 79.000 firms that do not file annual accounts for at
least one of the years they are active on the market. This would show up as exit and entry in the
decomposition, so we must delete these firms from the sample. Second, there are about 218.000
firms that report negative value added in at least one year, and who consequently would also have
negative TFP. The economic meaning of negative TFP is ambiguous and also the decomposition
uses a loglinear transformation of TFP as input, which rules out the use of these observations by
construction so this would again result in artificial entry and exit. From the 310.000 remaining
firms in our sample, there are about 194.800 firms for which there are no value added (2.800 firms),
labor (180.000 firms) or capital (12.000 firms) measures available in one of the years it is active,
even not after imputation of missing variables (see supra). Again, all observations for these firms
must be deleted from our sample to avoid artificial entry and exit. Furthermore, the decomposition
can not deal with firms that switch industries, therefore we delete all firms in the remaining sam-
ple that switch industries (6.000 firms). Finally, for a very small number of firms there are years
in which the loglinear transformation of one of the variables of interest is negative, which raises
problems in the calculation of TFP and the decompositions. After removing all these firms from
our sample, we remain with a sample of about 109.000 firms. The last step is to clean our sample
for measurement error. As detailed above, we clean our sample based on growth rate distributions
of productivity and inputs. After this step, we remain a sample of about 80.000 firms that will be
used for the MP and FHK decompositions. We would like to stress that the sole purpose of all these
cleaning rules is to eliminate potential measurement error and to obtain a representative sample
of firms that is suited for the decompositions. Also, we hope this approach to minimize potential
biases in the covariance components of our decomposition, in which firm growth of market share
and firm productivity growth serve as inputs, as these are key in answering our research questions.
We are aware that this cleaning procedure is very stringent and reduces our sample drastically.
Nonetheless, the cleaning rules we apply are objective from an empirical point of view. We loose
a lot of observations because once a firm has negative value added for one year, we need to drop
it because the log of a negative is not defined. We could have replaced negative value added by
the average of its positive lagged and future value. However, doing so would result in artificial
added value that was not created in reality. Especially in research on business cycles, this strategy
is hard to defend. Of course, the same argument could be made against our cleaning procedure:
the firms that are removed because they report negative value added are interesting themselves
because they are the weak firms that may suffer most from recession periods and are cleansed out
(see below). As with all empirical work, trade-offs must be made and we chose to limit ourselves to
a sample about which we are confident that our statements based on the decompositions are correct.
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For robustness check purposes, we also experimented with alternative samples in which we ap-
plied imputation and winsorization to retain more observations. The qualitative findings remain
unchanged when we (i) impute annual accounts if firms did not report (ii) impute value added
when it was negative, (iii) winsorize instead of drop outliers, (iii) include self-employed firms. Next
to imputing value added for firms that report negative value added, we also looked at this group
of firms separately since they are an interesting case themselves as one expects these firms to suf-
fer most from recession periods and to be cleansed out afterwards. Since we cannot obtain TFP
measures for firms with negative value added, we limit ourselves to discussing the evolution of the
percentage of firms that reports negative value added and to the percentage of firms that report
negative value added that exits. As can be seen in the figure below, the percentage of firms that
reports negative value added increases in recession periods, however it did not fall back in the
expansion period between 2002-2007. From the graph it is clear that the percentage of firms with
negative value added that exit increases after the great recession. This insights adds to our find-
ings on cleansing effects in the main body of the paper because this indicates that right after the
recession, firms who are not able to create added value, are more likely to be cleansed out.
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our sample since the productivity decompositions rely on loglinear TFP measures.
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B.3.6 Production function estimates
The table below presents the production function coefficient estimates per industry. For an overview
of the industry classification, see section B.4. As discussed in section B.3.1 of the appendix, the in-
dustry classification changed in 2006 from NACE rev. 1.1 to NACE rev. 2. This has consequences for
the estimation of the production function and the decompositions at the industry level. Obviously,
the same industry classification must be used for all years of the sample in order to estimate indus-
try specific production functions or to do a productivity decomposition at the industry level. It is
straightforward for firms that are active before and after the switch in the industry classification to
put these into either one of the classifications since we have its code for each classification. The only
assumption that is required, is that firms did not switch industries in the year that the classification
structure changed. However, for firms that entered after 2006, no NACE rev. 1.1 code is known.
Similarly, for firms that exit before 2006, no NACE rev. 2 code is known. Dropping these firms is a
possible solution for the estimation of the production function, but it is not for the decompositions
given our interest in entering and exiting firms. Therefore, we constructed a conversion from NACE
rev. 1.1 to NACE rev. 2 based on the firms that report in both classifications. From these firms,
we deduct which NACE rev. 1.1 to NACE rev. 2 two-digit combination has the highest frequency.
This allows us to assign all observations to the NACE rev. 1.1 or the NACE rev. 2 classification.
Although this maximizes the probability of assigning firms to the the correct classification, this re-
mains an imperfect solution. Therefore, we aim to minimize the number of observations that must
be assigned a NACE code based on our self-constructed conversion table. Since there are more firms
in our sample for which only the NACE rev. 1.1 classification is available, we choose to proceed
with the NACE rev. 1.1 classification both for the estimation of the production functions and for
the productivity decompositions. The firms for which only a NACE rev. 2 code is available, are
assigned the appropriate NACE rev. 1.1 code based on our self constructed conversion table.
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Table A10: Value Added production function coefficient estimates
Cobb Douglas Production Function Translog Production Function
NACE (Rev.1.1)
Labor Capital Labor Capital
#firms
1t5 0.53 0.18 0.55 0.19 2412
10t12 0.62 0.05 0.64 0.08 364
13t14 0.61 0.11 0.62 0.14 420
15t16 0.71 0.10 0.75 0.11 3653
17 0.71 0.15 0.75 0.13 935
18t19 0.78 0.10 0.82 0.10 574
20 0.76 0.12 0.78 0.11 972
21 0.71 0.07 0.87 0.05 273
22 0.80 0.08 0.82 0.09 2411
23t24 0.79 0.08 0.82 0.06 643
25 0.80 0.04 0.83 0.06 674
26 0.77 0.07 0.79 0.06 1089
27 0.78 0.14 0.82 0.09 205
28 0.77 0.10 0.80 0.09 3665
29 0.84 0.06 0.87 0.06 1194
30t31 0.83 0.10 0.86 0.11 448
32 0.89 0.11 0.92 0.10 141
33 0.76 0.12 0.83 0.10 519
34t35 0.83 0.12 0.85 0.09 571
36 0.79 0.08 0.81 0.10 1475
37 0.64 0.19 0.65 0.19 329
40t45 0.77 0.10 0.56 0.28 27017
50 0.74 0.11 0.75 0.11 8479
51 0.78 0.09 0.81 0.10 20904
52 0.63 0.08 0.65 0.09 25528
55 0.65 0.09 0.68 0.10 15468
60 0.67 0.13 0.70 0.14 5398
61t62 0.79 0.12 0.72 0.16 163
63 0.78 0.07 0.82 0.06 2335
64 0.77 0.12 0.79 0.14 612
65t66 0.80 0.05 0.72 0.09 1926
67 0.69 0.07 0.68 0.09 4473
70 0.56 0.12 0.57 0.21 5823
71 0.53 0.15 0.55 0.18 1312
72 0.85 0.09 0.84 0.09 3857
73t74 0.74 0.08 0.72 0.10 22703
Total 0.73 0.10 0.75 0.11 168965
a The coefficient estimates are obtained from value added production functions following the Wooldridge (2009) estimator that
relies on investments Olley and Pakes (1996) to proxy for unobserved productivity. This estimator is also robust to the Ackerberg
et al. (2015) critique. More information on the estimation procedure can be found in appendix B.
b The output elasticities of translog production functions are firm specific. The fourth and fifth column of this table show the
industry averages of these firm specific output elasticities.
c For some industries, the number of firms that can be used to estimate the production function is very small. This results in
low variation and difficulties to obtain reliable estimates for the production function. Therefore, as can be seen in the table, for
some industries a joint production function is assumed and estimated. For an overview of the classification, see B.4.
d All coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the five percent level.
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B.4 NACE Rev. 1.1 Industry Classification
NACE-code INDUSTRY NAME
TOTAL MANUFACTURING
Other production
1t5 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
10t14 Mining and quarrying
40t41 Electricity, gas and water supply
45 Construction
Goods producing
15t16 Food products, beverages and tobacco
17 Textile and textile products
18t19 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear
36 Manufacturing n.e.c.
37 Recycling
Intermediate manufacturing
20 Wood and products of wood and cork
21 Pulp, paper, paper products
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction recorded media
23t24 Chemical, coke, refined petroleum and fuel
25 Rubber and plastic products
26 Other non-metallic mineral products
27 Basic metals
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
Investment goods, excluding hightech
29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.
34t35 Transport Equipment
Electrical machinery & post and communication services
30 Office machinery and computers
31 Electrical machinery n.e.c.
32 Radio, television and communication equipment
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
64 Post and telecommunications
MARKET SERVICES, excluding post and telecommunications
Distribution
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motrocycles; retail sale of fuel
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of household goods
60 Land transport
61t62 Water and air transport
63 Supporting transport activities and travel agencies
55 Hotels and Restaurants
Finance and business
65t66 Financial intermediation
67 Supporting activities to financial intermediation
70 Real estate activities
71 Renting of machinery and equipment
72 Computer and related activities
73t74 Research and development and other business activities
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C Decomposition models
C.1 Dynamic Olley Pakes decomposition
The main body of the paper only includes the final equations from the decompositions. For com-
pleteness, we show how these equations come about. To decompose aggregate productivity growth
between two periods, we start from the aggregate productivity levels in year one (TFP1) and year
two (TFP2). In a dynamic context, surviving firms are defined as firms that are active both in
period one and period two. Hence aggregate productivity of surviving firms shows up both in TFP1
and TFP2. Exiting firms are defined as firms that are in the sample in year one, but not in year
two. Entering firms are firms that are not in the sample in year one, but are in the sample in year
two. Therefore, aggregate productivity of exiting firms only shows up in TFP1 while aggregate
productivity of entering firms only shows up in TFP2:
TFP1 = MSS1 ∗ TFPS1 +MSX1 ∗ TFPX1 (1)
TFP2 = MSS2 ∗ TFPS2 +MSE2 ∗ TFPE2 (2)
In which TFPS1,2/X1,2/E1,2 denote weighted average productivity levels of surviving, exiting or
entering firms in period one or two. MSS1,2/X1,2/E1,2 is the aggregate market share of surviving,
exiting or entering firms in year one or two. Since the sample in period one only consists of surviving
and exiting firms and the sample in period two only consists of surviving and entering firms, the
following equations hold:
MSS1 +MSX1 = 1→MSS1 = 1−MSX1 (3)
MSS2 +MSE2 = 1→MSS2 = 1−MSE2 (4)
Substituting (3) and (4) in (1) and (2) then results in:
TFP1 = (1−MSX1) ∗ TFPS1 +MSX1 ∗ TFPX1
= TFPS1 +MSX1 ∗ (TFPX1 − TFPS1)
(5)
TFP2 = (1−MSE2)TFPS2 +MSE2 ∗ TFPE2
= TFPS2 +MSE2 ∗ (TFPE2 − TFPS2)
(6)
As is common practice in the literature, all these components are expressed in logarithms. Hence
productivity growth in percentages can be obtained from subtracting (5) from (6):
∆TFP = TFPS2 +MSE2 ∗ (TFPE2 − TFPS2)− TFPS1 −MSX1 ∗ (TFPX1 − TFPS1)
∆TFP = TFPS2 − TFPS1︸ ︷︷ ︸
incumbents
+MSE2 ∗ (TFPE2 − TFPS2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
entry
+MSX1 ∗ (TFPS1 − TFPX1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
exit
(7)
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This equation shows how aggregate TFP growth can be decomposed into growth originating
respectively from incumbents, entry and exit. Surviving firms contribute positively if aggregate
productivity of the surviving firms increases over time. As surviving firms are active in both period
one and period two, it is straightforward for this group of firms to look at the difference between
aggregate productivity form period one to period two to infer the contribution of surviving firms to
the change in aggregate productivity. Entering firms contribute positively if aggregate productivity
of the entering firms is higher than aggregate productivity of the surviving firms in period two.
When a firm enters the industry, this firm will only pop up in the aggregate productivity level
the following period. Hence a change in aggregate productivity from period one to period two that
results from entry will be picked up in aggregate productivity in period two, which is why equation
(7) compares the aggregate productivity level of surviving and entering firms in period two to infer
the contribution of entering firms to the change in aggregate productivity. Exiting firms contribute
positively if aggregate productivity of surviving firms is higher than aggregate productivity of ex-
iting firms in period one. If a firm with a low productivity level exits in period one, this will result
in higher aggregate productivity in period two since the productivity level of the exiting firm is
not included in the aggregate productivity level of period two. So productivity growth from period
one to period two can result from firms with low productivity levels that exit in period one, which
is why equation (7) compares the aggregate productivity level of surviving and exiting firms in
period one to infer the contribution of exiting firms to the change in aggregate productivity. The
reason why Melitz and Polanec (2015) claim this decomposition to be superior to earlier work from
Baily et al. (1992), Griliches and Regev (1995) and Foster et al. (2001) is because of the intuitive
counterfactual for entry and exit. This decomposition only shows a positive contribution from entry
if entering firms show higher productivity levels than incumbents. Furthermore, there is only a pos-
itive contribution form exit if exiting firms exhibit lower productivity levels than incumbents. Other
decomposition methods require to use the same counterfactual for the entry and exit components,
which potentially results in biased contributions from entry and exit (see Melitz and Polanec (2015)
for a further discussion on this topic).
While equation (7) allows to investigate the importance of entry and exit for aggregate productivity,
it does not reflect the contribution of market share (re)allocation for aggregate productivity growth.
To attain this, it is necessary to add the insight of Olley and Pakes (1996) to equation (7). They
showed for a static context that any aggregate productivity measure can be decomposed into the
sum of the uweighted average productivity level and the covariance between the productivity levels
and the aggregation measure:
TFPt =
∑
imsit ∗ tfpit
=
∑
i(mst +msit −mst) ∗ (tfpt + tfpit − tfpt)
= Nt ∗mst ∗ tfpt +
∑
i(msit −mst)(tfpit − tfpt)
= tfpt +
∑
i(msit −mst)(tfpit − tfpt)
(8)
In which tfpit and msit are productivity and market share of firm i in year t. tfpt is the
unweighted average of all firm level TFP estimates in year t and mst the unweighted average of
all market shares in year t. The summation component of equation (8) is equal to the covariance
between labor share and productivity. If this covariance is positive, then aggregate productivity is
67
higher than it would be if labor shares were randomly allocated. So a higher covariance implies
more efficient allocation of labor. Applying this transformation to the productivity components in
equation (7) and rearranging the equation results in:
∆TFP = tfpS2 − tfpS1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆TFP surv
+
∑
i
(msiS2 −msS2)(tfpiS2 − tfpS2)−
∑
i
(msiS1 −msS1)(tfpiS1 − tfpS1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆Cov(TFP,MS)surv
+MSE2
[
tfpE2 − tfpS2
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
TFP entrt−survt
+MSE2
[∑
i
(msiE2 −msE2)(tfpiE2 − tfpE2)−
∑
i
(msiS2 −msS2)(tfpiS2 − tfpS2)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cov(TFP,MS)entrt−survt
+MSX1
[
tfpS1 − tfpX1
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
TFP survt−1−exitt−1
+MSX1
[∑
i
(msiS1 −msS1)(tfpiS1 − tfpS1)−
∑
i
(msiX1 −msX1)(tfpiX1 − tfpX1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cov(TFP,MS)survt−1−exitt−1
(9)
It is worthwile to discuss the intuition behind each of these components. ∆TFP surv refers to
the evolution of unweighted average productivity in incumbent firms, i.e. a shift in the productivity
distribution of incumbents. ∆Cov(TFP,MS)surv refers to the growth in the covariance between
market share and productivity for incumbent firms. This component is positive when one of the
following actions takes place: (i) incumbent firms with higher than average productivity succeed in
increasing their market share; (ii) incumbent firms with higher than average market share increase
their productivity; (iii) incumbent firms with lower than average productivity loose market share;
(iv) incumbent firms with lower than average market share become less productive. TFP entrt−survt
refers to the difference in unweighted average productivity between entrants and incumbents. It
shows whether the average entering firm is more or less productive than an average incumbent.
Cov(TFP,MS)entrt−survt refers to the difference in the covariances between entrants and incum-
bents. Thereby this component answers the question whether market share allocation is more effi-
cient in entering firms than in incumbent firms. TFP survt−1−exitt−1 refers to the difference in un-
weighted average productivity between surviving and exiting firms. So it shows whether the average
exiting firm is more or less productive than an average incumbent. Cov(TFP,MS)survt−1−exitt−1
refers to the difference in the covariances between incumbents and exiting firms. As such this com-
ponent learns whether market share allocation is more efficient in incumbents than in exiting firms.
As argued in the main body of the paper, a potential drawback of this approach is that the unit
of observation is a firm i in year t. As a result, all components of the model abstract from the
existence of markets at more disaggregated levels. So the model assumes all firms in the economy
compete with each other, while it is more reasonable that firms are in closer competition with
firms that are doing the same activity. Therefore, in a working paper version of Melitz and Polanec
(2015) these authors enrich their model with an industry (disaggregated level) to sector (aggregate
level) extension. This extension incorporates an additional industry dimension (j) in the model. All
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components of the extended model are calculated at the industry level and subsequently weighted
averages of these components are constructed to obtain the outcomes at the aggregated level. How-
ever, this approach is inappropriate for the ∆Cov(TFP,MS)surv component since market share
can be gained or lost not only to firms in the own industry, but also gained or lost from or to firms
in other industries. Therefore, the change in covariance at the aggregate level is not equal to the
weighted average of changes in industry covariances. More specifically, an inter industry reallocation
component must be added on top of this intra industry covariance channel in order the sum of all
components to aggregate up to the change in aggregate sector productivity:
Cov(TFP,MS)surv,t =
∑
j
nsSj
∑
i
(msiSjt −msjSt)(tfpiSjt − tfpjSt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intra industry covariance
+
∑
j
(msSjt − nsSj)(tfpSjt − tfpSt))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inter industry covariance
(10)
In which the i, j and t subscripts refer to firm, industry and year. nsSj is the ratio of the
number of surviving firms in the industry to the number of surviving firms at the aggregate level
(nsSj = nSj/nS). It is the weighting measure to construct aggregate intra industry covariance,
which is defined as the weighted average of the industry level covariances between market shares
and productivity.1 Furthermore tfpjt and tfpt are respectively aggregate TFP at the industry and
sector level.2 The interpretation for the intra industry covariance is identical to the one of the
∆Cov(TFP,MS)surv component from equation (9). The inter industry covariance is based on ag-
gregate productivity levels instead of average productivity levels. It shows whether the aggregate
market share of incumbents (relative to the market share expressed in number of surviving firms) is
consistent with aggregate productivity of incumbents in industries. So the change in inter industry
covariance for incumbents will be positive when one of the following actions takes place: (i) firms
in industries with higher than overall aggregate productivity upsize, i.e. hire more employees; (ii)
industries in which firms are large (in terms of employment) become more productive; (iii) firms
in industries with lower than overall aggregate productivity downsize, i.e. dismiss employees; (iv)
industries in which firms are small (in terms of employment) become less productive.
To make a similar distinction between the intra and inter industry contribution of entry and exit to
the aggregate productivity evolution, the following decomposition is applied to the entry and exit
components of equation (7):
TFPxt−TFPyt =
∑
j
msj(tfpxjt− tfpyjt) +
∑
j
msj((tfpyjt− tfpxjt)− (TFPyt−TFPxt)) (11)
With capital letters denoting productivity at the aggregate level and small letters denoting produc-
tivity at the industry level and x and y referring to S, E for the group of entering firms and to S
and X for the group of exiting firms. Substituting equation (10) and (11) in equation (7) results
in a decomposition that starts from the components at the industry level to obtain the aggregated
sector level counterparts:
1It is inappropriate to use the same market shares for aggregation as for the calculation of the covariances.
Otherwise it would not be possible to distinguish between a shift in the distribution (reflected by the change in
average productivity) and reallocation.
2Aggregate productivity is always calculated as a weighted average.
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∆TFP =
∑
j
nsj(tfpSj2 − tfpSj1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆TFP surv
+
∑
j
nsj
[∑
i
(msiSj2 −msSj2)(tfpiSj2 − tfpSj2)−
∑
i
(msiSj1 −msSj1)(tfpiSj1 − tfpSj1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆ Intra ind Cov(TFP,MS)surv
+
∑
j
(msSj2 − nsSj)(tfpSj2 − tfpS2)−
∑
j
(msSj1 − nsSj)(tfpSj1 − tfpS1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆ Inter ind Cov(TFP,MS)surv
+
∑
j
msj2 ∗msEj2(tfpEj2 − tfpSj2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intra indentrt−survt
+
∑
j
msj2 ∗msEj2 [(tfpSj2 − tfpEj2)− (TFPS2 − TFPE2)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inter indentrt−survt
+
∑
j
msj1 ∗msXj1(tfpSj1 − tfpXj1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intra indsurvt−1−exitt−1
+
∑
j
msj1 ∗msXj1 [(tfpXj1 − tfpSj1)− (TFPX1 − TFPS1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inter indsurvt−1−exitt−1
(12)
For incumbent firms, this decomposition shows how much of the aggregate productivity evolu-
tion is caused by a shift of the distribution (∆TFP surv), how much intra industry reallocation of
market share contributes to the aggregate productivity evolution (∆ Intra ind Cov(TFP,MS)surv)
and how important inter industry reallocation of market share is for productivity growth at the
aggregate sector level. For entering and exiting firms the model shows how aggregate industry
productivity premia of entering over surviving and surviving over exiting firms contribute to the
aggregate productivity evolution (Intra indentrt−survt and Intra indsurvt−1−exitt−1). Finally, Inter
indentrt−survt and Inter indsurvt−1−exitt−1 compare the aggregate industry productivity premia of
surviving over entering firms and exiting over surviving firms with the aggregate sector productivity
premia of surviving over entering and exiting over surviving firms.
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C.2 Foster Haltiwanger Krizan
The main body of the paper discusses how decomposition models that start from tracking individual
firms compare to decomposition models that start from the cross-sectional distribution of market
shares and productivity.3 We refer to the paper of MP for an extensive theoretical and empirical
justification of this argument. As argued in the main body, we include the FHK decomposition
because it allows us to distinguish productivity shocks and job reallocation, thereby it helps us to
assess whether or not recession periods induce cleansing effects due to job reallocation. Moreover
the FHK decomposition also serves as a robustness check for the entry and exit components. The
contribution from the FHK decomposition to the discussion on cleansing effects of recessions is in
the between-component (see infra). This between component regards changes in market share (job
reallocation) while keeping the difference in productivity to the aggregate fixed. Thereby it rules
out simultaneity in productivity changes and job reallocation:
∆TFP =
∑
i
msSi1(tfpSi2 − tfpSi1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆Withinsurv
+
∑
i
(msSi2 −msSi1)(tfpSi1 − tfp1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆Betweensurv
+
∑
i
(msSi2 −msSi1)(tfpSi2 − tfpSi1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆Covariancesurv
+
∑
i
msEi2(tfpEi2 − tfp1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entry
−
∑
i
msXi1(tfpXi1 − tfp1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exit
(13)
3This distinction is also the reason why the FHK model at the aggregate can be calculated as a simple weighted
average of the firm level components while the MP model cannot be constructed as a weighted average. In a cross
section of a group of firms that are active in different industries there is inter-industry reallocation. This channel
restricts one from expressing aggregate covariance as a weighted average of industry covariances. However, when you
start the analysis from the firm level and only regard firm level dynamics, this channel is not identified.
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